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REMIXING RAWLS: CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURAL LIBERTIES IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES  
JONATHAN GINGERICH* 
ABSTRACT 
This article develops a liberal theory of cultural rights that must be guaranteed by just legal and 
political institutions. People form their own individual conceptions of the good in the cultural 
space constructed by the political societies they inhabit. This article argues that only rarely do 
individuals develop views of what is valuable that diverge more than slightly from the 
conceptions of the good widely circulating in their societies. In order for everyone to have an 
equal opportunity to autonomously form their own independent conception of the good, rather 
than merely following others, culture must be democratically controlled. Equal respect for 
members of a liberal democracy requires that all citizens have roughly equal opportunities to do 
things like make movies, publish novels, and exhibit paintings. This article contends that the 
contemporary American legal order fails to guarantee that all citizens have roughly equal 
opportunities to shape and influence their shared culture. Guaranteeing the liberty to do so 
would require reforms to many areas of law, including applying anti-discrimination law more 
broadly to the conduct of cultural organizations, expanding fair use protections in copyright law, 
limiting the ability of businesses to arbitrarily refuse service to customers, and restricting private 
control of capital in order to democratize the means of cultural production 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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 When, in 2016, for the second year in a row, exclusively white actors were nominated for 
Oscar awards, protests erupted on social media and prominent actors and filmmakers announced 
that they would boycott the Academy Awards ceremony.1 The #OscarsSoWhite protests did not 
argue that the First Amendment free speech rights of minority actors and directors had been 
abridged. Legally, minority actors and directors have the same rights as white directors to go out 
and make movies. The complaint of #OscarsSoWhite was that minority actors and filmmakers 
cannot use their rights to write and speak and create culture as effectively as white actors and 
filmmakers can. Minority filmmakers do not have equal access to Hollywood gatekeepers.  
 The argument of #OscarsSoWhite seems political in nature, even though it is not about 
First Amendment rights or state action. #OscarsSoWhite protests are about systemic racism, but 
they are also about cultural elites refusing to let a diversity of approaches to film and storytelling 
into their prestigious institutions and about a failure of citizens to regard one another as equally 
capable of contributing to their shared culture. Some of the moral force of #OscarsSoWhite 
protests may be about employment discrimination, but the force of the protest is not confined to 
fairness in employment. Even if, counterfactually, minority actors and filmmakers could find 
work in Hollywood as easily as white actors and filmmakers, and even if winning Academy 
Awards were unimportant for the career prospects of actors and filmmakers, it would still be 
troubling for the Oscars to honor only white people. The trouble is that the whiteness of the 
 
1 See Tim Gray, Academy Nominates All White Actors for Second Year in Row, VARIETY (Jan. 
14, 2016, 7:16 AM), http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/oscar-nominations-2016-diversity-white-
1201674903/ (discussing #OscarsSoWhite protests on social media); David Ng, Spike Lee and 
Jada Pinkett Smith to Boycott Oscars; Academy Responds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2016, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/moviesnow/la-et-spike-lee-to-boycott-oscars-
html-20160118-htmlstory.html (discussing boycotts of the Academy Awards Ceremony). 
	 2 
Oscars signals that not all members of our society are, in the words of W.E.B. Du Bois, “co-
worker[s] in the kingdom of culture.”2  
 Liberal political philosophers have debated at length how citizens should treat one 
another as participants in politics, focusing on rights of political participation and reciprocity in 
describing the conditions of democratic legitimacy.3 These philosophers have paid less attention 
to what obligations of justice arise from citizens’ participation in cultural activity.4 This article 
contends that rights of cultural participation and reciprocity also matter for a constitution’s 
legitimacy. Specifically, a legitimate democracy must ensure that all citizens have a fair, roughly 
equal opportunity to shape their shared culture. Satisfying this requirement in the United States 
requires extensive changes to contemporary public and private law.5 
 
2 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES 4 (8th ed. 1909). 
3 See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 26–29 (2004). 
4 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 43–44 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
(arguing that “[i]n all parts of society” there should be “roughly the same prospects of culture 
and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed” but excluding “prospects of 
culture” from the equal basic liberties protected by the (lexically prior) first principle of justice). 
In contrast with the emphasis on political liberties and the distribution of economic goods that 
take center stage in much contemporary liberal political philosophy, scholars of law and 
aesthetics who study free speech, copyright, intellectual property, remixes, and internet culture 
have increasingly argued that it is important for liberal democracies to promote and protect not 
just a democratic system of politics but also a democratic culture. See Oren Bracha & Talha 
Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
229, 232 (2014). This article builds on the work of legal scholars who have developed theories 
that focus, among other things, on the satisfaction of cultural conditions necessary for the 
exercise of human capabilities or for human flourishing, see William W. Fisher III, 
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1746–50 (1988), how to 
politically design an attractive culture, see Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic 
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
3–4 (2004), what conditions must hold for individuals to act and express themselves 
autonomously, see Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual 
Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 469–71 (1992), and how law affects a society’s political 
culture, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 285 (1996).  
5 In this article, the term “citizens” is used to denote equal participants in a scheme of political 
cooperation. However, the obligations and rights of reciprocity likely extend beyond those 
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 Part I describes the philosophical argument for the norm that legitimate democracies must 
ensure that all citizens have roughly equal opportunities to influence the political process. 
Citizens of a democracy remain free and equal by mutually committing to an ideal of political 
equality, so that each person is both ruled and a participant in ruling.6 In legitimate democracies, 
citizens equally share the burdens of living together in a community and regard one another as 
political equals, respecting one another’s rights to participate in the democratic process by voting 
and holding office.7 Liberal legitimacy also requires that citizens take one another seriously as 
contributors to political dialogue.8 For instance, a society in which everyone had an unquestioned 
right to vote and run for office but where men made up their minds in advance that they would 
not seriously entertain any political arguments advanced by women could not be a legitimate 
democracy, for the members of such a society would fail to equally share the burdens and 
opportunities that come from living together in a community. 
 In describing the liberal argument for rights of political participation, this article focuses 
on John Rawls’s argument that the “fair value” of the “equal political liberties” must be 
guaranteed to all citizens. 9 Rawls’s argument provides a useful starting point for theorizing 
about cultural rights for two reasons. First, Rawls’s theory of justice provides a compelling and 
generative account of why the fair value of the political liberties matters for the legitimacy of a 
 
members of existing political societies who are presently accorded legal citizenship. See Sarah 
Song, The Significance of Territorial Presence and the Rights of Immigrants, in MIGRATION IN 
POLITICAL THEORY: THE ETHICS OF MOVEMENT AND MEMBERSHIP 225, 233–34 (Sarah Fine & 
Lea Ypi eds., 2016); see also Sarah Song, Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights, 13 
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 607, 608–11 (2009). 
6 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4–6 (expanded ed. 2005). 
7 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 191–92. 
8 Id. at 91. 
9 Id. at 149. 
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constitution.10 Second, his method of “reflective equilibrium,” which works back and forth 
between our judgements about specific cases and our general philosophical judgements about 
ethics until we reach justified conclusions, is particularly well suited for evaluating the concrete 
legal reforms needed to make a constitution legitimate.11 
 After describing the rationale for ensuring that all citizens have a fair, roughly equal 
chance to participate in politics in Part I, Part II argues that anyone who accepts a guarantee of 
the fair value of the political liberties as a condition of democratic legitimacy should also 
embrace a guarantee of cultural liberties. In a just society with a legitimate constitution, rights of 
cultural participation must be insulated from the distorting effects of wealth, social power, and 
persistent bias. Because culture is where citizens figure out who they are and what they value in 
conversation with one another, the urgency of cultural liberties is so great that their fair value is a 
constitutional essential. To be morally legitimate, a constitution must guarantee that all similarly 
talented and motivated citizens have roughly an equal chance to shape and influence the culture 
in which they live, just as they must have a roughly equal chance to shape and influence the 
government’s laws and policies.12 When some citizens can influence the cultural life of a society 
more than others, simply because of their wealth, racial or sexual privilege, or membership in 
elite cultural networks, equality of citizenship is undermined. If overwhelmingly white Academy 
Awards reflect a restriction of cultural influence to people who have racial or economic 
privilege, then the conditions of liberal legitimacy have not been satisfied. To diagnose and 
 
10 See Frank I. Michelman, Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Question of Judicial Review: 
A Comment, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407, 1417–18 (2004); see also Frank I. Michelman, In 
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. 
REV. 962, 990–91 (1973). 
11 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 29–32. 
12 Whether such constitutional provisions would need to be judicially enforceable is a separate 
question. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 118. 
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identify remedies for these failures of equal citizenship, this article develops a theory that I call 
semiotic justice because it focuses attention on how obligations of justice apply to collective 
practices of meaning-making.13 
 Guaranteeing the fair value of cultural liberties—ensuring that similarly endowed and 
motivated citizens have roughly the same chance to shape the culture in which they live—has 
broad implications for the interface of a society’s political structure and its cultural order, giving 
rise to obligations related to anti-discrimination law, free speech law, copyright and property 
entitlements, and the state action doctrine. Because the fair value of liberties to participate in 
culture can be guaranteed with many different legal arrangements, the implications of semiotic 
justice for law and policy are most clearly illustrated by considering failures to ensure the fair 
value of the cultural liberties. Part III of this article considers several such failures: the whiteness 
of the Academy Awards, the ability of incumbent artists to use copyright to block the creation of 
appropriation art, and the ability of business owners to arbitrarily refuse to serve customers.  
 In response to these violations of the fair value of the cultural liberties, semiotic justice 
suggests that the state must organize its economic system so that citizens have free time to 
participate in culture, adequately fund public schools and universities so that citizens can acquire 
the skills they need to express their beliefs about the good life, narrow the scope of property 
rights to prevent the wealthy from turning economic power into cultural control, and provide 
 
13 “Semiotic justice” modifies John Fiske’s phrase, “semiotic democracy.” See JOHN FISKE, 
TELEVISION CULTURE 236–39 (1987) (arguing that television fosters a “semiotic democracy” 
through its playfulness); see also WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 28–31 (2004) 
(deploying the phrase “semiotic democracy” in a theory of intellectual property). 
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public funding for the arts and humanities.14 The fair value of  liberties of cultural participation 
are among the equal basic liberties that must be guaranteed in a legitimate democratic society. 
I. RAWLS’S JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS AND THE FAIR VALUE OF THE POLITICAL LIBERTIES 
 John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has served as the focal point for much liberal 
political philosophy in the past five decades and provides a prominent example of contemporary 
liberal thought about how citizens can live together as equal members of a democratic society.15 
This Part briefly sets out Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and explores why Rawls believes 
that a legitimate democracy must guarantee the fair value of the political liberties to its citizens.  
 For Rawls, the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation is “[t]he most fundamental 
idea in [the] conception” of justice as fairness.16 This idea has, for Rawls, three essential 
features. First, social cooperation is more than mere activity coordinated by the dictates of a 
central government. Social cooperation is “guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures 
which those cooperating accept as appropriate to regulate their conduct.”17 Second, social 
cooperation is marked by a commitment to reciprocity, including “the idea of fair terms of 
cooperation” that everyone could “reasonably accept, and sometimes should accept, provided 
that everyone else likewise accepts them.”18 Third, social cooperation includes the idea that 
 
14 Many of these reforms are already suggested by Rawls’s guarantee of the fair value of the 
political liberties or by the requirements of fair equality of opportunity, but semiotic justice goes 
beyond the reform agenda contained in Rawls’s political liberties because it puts the fair value of 
cultural liberties on a level with the value of (formal) equal basic liberties. See generally Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1643, 1644 (2004). In this respect, my argument in this Article has a close affinity to Seana 
Shiffrin’s argument that the fair equality of opportunity should be “elevat[ed] . . . to a higher 
level of priority” in Rawlsian theory. Id. at 1644.  
15 See Henry S. Richardson, John Rawls (1921–2002), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
16 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 5. 
17 Id. at 6. 
18 Id. 
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participants pursue their “rational advantage,” which specifies what the social cooperators “are 
seeking to advance from the standpoint of their own good.”19 
 Society regarded as a fair system of cooperation is composed of free and equal persons 
who have two fundamental “moral powers”: 
(i) One such power is the capacity for a sense of justice: it is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the 
principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation. 
(ii) The other moral power is a capacity for a conception of the good: it is the 
capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. Such 
a conception is an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a person’s 
conception of what is of value in human life or, alternatively, of what is regarded 
as a fully worthwhile life. The elements of such a conception are normally set 
within, and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrines in light of which the various ends and aims are ordered and understood.20 
These powers are not momentary but instead are realized over the course of a full life.21  
 To illustrate the political meaning of the two moral powers, Rawls constructs a thought 
experiment, which he calls the original position.22 Hypothetical representatives of citizens who 
wish to come together to form a political society meet in the original position to agree on a 
conception of justice. In the original position, these trustees are situated behind a “veil of 
ignorance” and “are not allowed to know the social positions or the particular comprehensive 
doctrines of the persons they represent,” although they know “the general commonsense facts of 
human psychology and political sociology.”23  
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 18–19. 
21 Id. at 19. 
22 Id. at 14. 
23 Id. at 15, 101. 
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 Within the original position, and given the conception of persons as having the two moral 
powers, Rawls argues that the representatives will select two principles of justice to guide 
constitution-making, legislating, and adjudication: 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for 
all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).24 
These principles are lexically ordered, meaning that the basic liberties guaranteed by the first 
principle cannot be traded off to provide more material goods, even to the worst off, pursuant to 
the second principle.25 Political power can only be legitimately exercised in a liberal democracy 
when it is exercised in accordance with “a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable 
to their common human reason,” where the constitutional essentials include the first principle of 
justice along with a “social minimum providing for the basic needs of all citizens.”26 
 The basic liberties are those liberties that are essential to providing the political and social 
conditions necessary for free and equal persons to develop and exercise the two moral powers.27 
Rawls divides up the basic liberties into two categories. First, there are those that “enable 
citizens to develop and exercise [the moral] powers in judging the justice of the basic structure of 
society and its social policies,” which are “the equal political liberties and freedom of thought.”28 
 
24 Id. at 42–43. The difference principle means that “unless there is a distribution that makes both 
persons better off . . . an equal distribution is to be preferred.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 76 (1971).  
25 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 43. 
26 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 137, 228–29. 
27 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 45. 
28 Id. 
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Second, there are those liberties that “enable citizens to develop and exercise their moral powers 
in forming and revising and in rationally pursing (individually or, more often, in association with 
others) their conceptions of the good.”29 Thus, securing the basic liberties should ensure that 
people who participate in a project of social cooperation can realize the two moral powers. 
Cooperators would not give up these basic liberties, or even risk doing so, because of the 
centrality of the moral powers to the conception of the person that Rawls presupposes.30 
 Rawls’s difference principle may allow for significant social and economic inequality, 
provided that such inequality is to the advantage of the least well off.31 There is a risk that such 
inequalities might distort equal access to the public political forum, turning the political liberties 
guaranteed by the first principle into empty formalities. For instance, if everyone had the same 
right to political speech but only a few could spend great sums on political campaigns, the liberty 
of free political speech would be worth more to wealthy citizens than to the poor.32  
 To prevent the equal political liberties from becoming empty formalities, Rawls describes 
his first principle as including a “proviso” according to which “the fair value of the equal 
political liberties” (and only these liberties) must be guaranteed to every citizen. 33 This proviso 
responds to the objection that the equal liberties in a modern state are merely formal:  
[T]he worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their economic or social 
position, must be sufficiently equal in the sense that all have a fair opportunity to hold 
public office and to affect the outcome of elections and the like . . . . The requirement of 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 102. 
31 Id. at 158; see also Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 1647. 
32 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 358; see also Norman Daniels, Equal Liberty and the Unequal Worth 
of Liberties, in READING RAWLS 253, 254–58 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975); Liam Murphy, Why 
Does Inequality Matter: Reflections on the Political Morality of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-
First Century, 68 TAX L. REV. 613, 615–16 (2015) (“[T]he power that comes with great wealth, 
especially, seems to have a force in political life that no kind of legal regulation is likely to 
undo.”). 
33 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 149. 
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the fair value of the political liberties . . . is part of the meaning of the two principles of 
justice.34  
Rawls reasons that the proviso “secures for each citizen a fair and roughly equal access to the use 
of a public facility designed to serve a definite political purpose, namely, the public facility 
specified by the constitutional rules and procedures which govern the political process and 
control the entry into positions of political authority.”35 Additionally, Rawls concedes that the 
difference principle is, by itself, insufficient to prevent the distortion of the value of the equal 
political liberties. The “public facility” of political institutions has “limited space,” and 
“[w]ithout a guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties, those with greater means can 
combine together and exclude those who have less. . . . The limited space of the public political 
forum . . . allows the usefulness of the political liberties to be far more subject to citizens’ social 
position and economic means than the usefulness of other basic liberties.”36  
For Rawls, the guarantee of the fair value of political liberties suggests that Buckley v. 
Valeo, in which the Supreme Court struck down limits on campaign expenditures in favor of 
individual candidates as contrary to the First Amendment,37 violates justice as fairness. Buckley 
“seems to reject altogether the idea that Congress may try to establish the fair value of the 
political liberties” by limiting wealthy citizens’ use of economic clout to influence the political 
process.38 
 Guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties does not require that every single 
citizen have an equal chance of becoming president, that democracies conduct elections by lot, 
that every citizen should be equally provided with airtime on television to express their political 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 150. 
36 Id. 
37 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). 
38 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 360. 
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views, or that the state handicap particularly eloquent political speakers to keep all citizens 
chances of attaining political office roughly equal. Guaranteeing the fair value of the political 
liberties ensures that “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of 
influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their 
economic and social class.”39 Rawls means that citizens who are equally gifted and motivated at 
politics must have an equal chance to influence policy and attain public office. Guaranteeing the 
fair value of the political liberties insulates a democracy’s political life from non-political 
influences and guards against political outcomes that reflect inequalities of wealth or status 
rather than citizens’ considered judgments about how best to achieve justice. 
 Rawls insists that the fair value of the equal political liberties extends only to the equal 
political liberties and no further, because securing the fair value of all of the basic liberties would 
be “either irrational, or superfluous, or socially divisive.”40 If such a requirement meant “that 
income and wealth are to be distributed equally,” the requirement would be irrational because it 
would “not allow society to meet the requirements of social organization and efficiency.”41 If, on 
the other hand, such a condition would require that “a certain level of income and wealth is to be 
assured to everyone in order to express their ideal of the equal worth of the basic liberties” then it 
would be superfluous.42 This is both because the difference principle requires the basic structure 
to be arranged in a way that will guarantee that every individual has the greatest level of wealth 
possible, consistent with the first principle of justice and the fair equality of opportunity,43 and 
 
39 Id. at 358. 
40 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 150–51. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. 
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because a “social minimum” is among the constitutional essentials.44 On the other hand, if 
guaranteeing the fair value of the basic liberties “means that income and wealth are to be 
distributed according to the content of certain interests regarded as central to citizens’ plans of 
life, for example, religious interest, then it is socially divisive.”45 Allocating extra social 
resources to citizens who claim religious needs to erect magnificent temples would violate 
justice as fairness.46 Thus, Rawls concludes that while the equal political liberties must provide 
all citizens roughly equal chances to influence public policy and hold public office, such a 
requirement cannot be extended to the other basic liberties. 
II. CULTURAL LIBERTIES AND SEMIOTIC JUSTICE 
 Rawls argues that a legitimate constitution in a just society must ensure that rights of 
political participation are insulated from the distorting effects of money and social power.47 The 
formal political liberties must be guaranteed their “fair value” for all citizens in a democracy so 
that “all have a fair opportunity to hold public office and to affect the outcome of elections, and 
the like.”48 In this Part, I argue that a just democracy must ensure that all citizens have a real 
chance to participate in the cultural life of their community and must protect citizens from 
having their views about the shape of their shared culture disregarded by other citizens for 
reasons that have nothing to do with what any individual citizens think culture should look like 
or that merely reflect unequal allocations of cultural capital.49 
 
44 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 228–29. 
45 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 151. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 150. 
48 Id. at 149. 
49 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in READINGS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 280, 282–
86 (Nicole Woolsey Biggart ed., 2002) (describing cultural capital as a variety of capital that 
takes the form of dispositions of mind and body acquired through education and which can be 
institutionalized through formal credentials such as academic qualifications). 
	 13 
 The political liberties are the subset of the equal basic liberties that are concerned with 
political participation, like the right to vote and the right to participate in political debates.50 The 
cultural liberties are the subset of the equal basic liberties that enable citizens to participate in 
shaping their culture, like the right to contribute to artistic expression and to share one’s views 
about what a good life looks like. Just as guaranteeing the fair value of political liberties is 
necessary for the development and exercise of the first moral power (the capacity for a sense of 
justice), it is necessary to guarantee the fair value of cultural liberties to ensure that people can 
develop and exercise the second moral power (the capacity for a conception of the good). I 
designate my theory of the fair value of the cultural liberties semiotic justice. Relying on 
arguments drawn from literary and cultural theory, I argue that the ability to participate in 
shaping what a culture looks like is a necessary element of expressing and developing one’s own 
conception of the good, and I argue that many of the reasons that it is important to guarantee the 
fair value of the political liberties apply to cultural liberties as well. Ultimately, the urgency of 
cultural liberties is so great that their fair value is a constitutional essential: a legitimation-worthy 
constitution is one that guarantees the fair value not only of the political liberties but also of the 
cultural liberties.51 
A. Semiotic Justice: The Fair Value of the Cultural Liberties 
 For Rawls, the equal political liberties appear on the list of the basic liberties because 
they, along with freedom of thought, allow citizens to develop their first moral power: “to 
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of 
 
50 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 44. 
51 The locution “legitimation-worthy” is due to Frank Michelman. See Frank I. Michelman, 
Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
663, 674–75 (2008). This article will use “legitimate” and “legitimation-worthy” 
interchangeably. 
	 14 
political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation”52 Citizens’ representatives in the 
original position would insist on guaranteeing the fair value of the equal political liberties 
because doing so is so essential to protecting the indispensable first moral power.53 
 They would be equally unwilling, however, to gamble with the second moral power.54 
Liberty of conscience and freedom of association are, Rawls says, connected with “the capacity 
for a (complete) conception of the good,” and this explains their inclusion on the list of the equal 
basic liberties.55 This Part argues, like the political liberties, the cultural liberties deserve special 
constitutional protection from exercises of financial, political, or social clout in order to ensure 
that citizens can develop the second moral power. Citizens need a voice in what their cultural 
world looks like. If wealth or social prestige determines what television shows and novels get 
produced and published and talked about at bars and coffee shops, democracy is out of reach. 
Citizens’ representatives in the original position would be unwilling to risk losing a voice in 
what their shared cultural world looks like and would, therefore, insist on a proviso of semiotic 
justice parallel to the proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties. 
1. The Political Economy of Culture 
 The argument for a semiotic justice proviso is rooted in the notion that trustees in the 
original position know certain “general commonsense facts” about culture, just as they know 
“the general commonsense facts of human psychology and political sociology.”56 These 
 
52 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 19. 
53 Id. at 106–10. 
54 Many or all of the basic liberties play important roles in the realization of both moral powers. 
However, the emphasis of the political liberties is on their connection with the first moral power 
while the emphasis of the liberty of conscience and freedom of association is their connection 
with the second moral power. See id. at 45. 
55 Id. at 113. 
56 Id. at 101. 
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commonsense facts include an understanding of how political and economic realities predictably 
and systematically shape cultural production and consumption. 
 Culture is a public space in which members of a society articulate and develop their 
conceptions of the good and the meaning of life.57 I take “culture” to mean this space rather than 
any particular set of conceptions deployed within it. What constitutes culture, like the basic 
liberties, is given by a list of practices that express what people value non-instrumentally.58 
Roughly speaking, culture is “all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and 
representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and 
that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure.”59 People use these 
mechanisms to share and learn about their own and other’s conceptions of value, meaning, and 
the good. This list is vague because the precise contours of “culture” shift over time and from 
place to place. The list is expansive because limiting culture to certain varieties of human 
behavior risks treating culture as something that people do outside of and apart from their daily 
 
57 See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1780–1950, at 34 (1958) (drawing from 
Wordsworth to argue that “Culture, the 'embodied spirit of a People', the true standard of 
excellence, became available, in the progress of the [Nineteenth Century], as the court of appeal 
in which real values were determined, usually in opposition to the 'factitious' values thrown up 
by the market and similar operations of society”). 
58 See EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, at xii (1993). 
59 Id.; see Balkin, supra note 4, at 36 (“By ‘culture’ I mean the collective processes of meaning-
making in a society. The realm of culture, however, is much broader than the concern of the First 
Amendment or the free speech principle. Armaments and shampoo are part of culture; so too are 
murder and robbery. And all of these things can affect people’s lives and shape who they are.”). 
The practices that constitute culture have only relative autonomy from politics. In many ways, 
culture is intensely political. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SAID, HUMANISM AND DEMOCRATIC 
CRITICISM 128–29 (2004). But while politics and culture connect in many ways, culture has a 
domain that is at least partially its own and that is meaningfully distinct from the domain of 
politics. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION 37–38 (Randal Johnson 
trans., 1993) (“[T]he literary and artistic field . . . is contained within the field of power . . . while 
possessing a relative autonomy with respect to it, especially as regards its economic and political 
principles of hierarchization.”). 
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lives.60 While the list is vague and expansive, it is restricted to activities that reflect peoples’ 
views about what is non-instrumentally valuable or worthwhile. Culture does not include 
activities that are pursued only to accumulate wealth, political power, or social capital in order to 
pursue other distinct ends.61  
 Cultural space is not wholly defined by the political practices of the state. It also reflects 
informal networks and practices of cultural dissemination, which makes it somewhat more 
removed from the principles of political justice than the facility of political space.62 However, 
cultural space is defined in important ways by the rules that the state institutes to regulate it and 
it is, in this way, part of the basic structure of society.63 The expressions of conceptions of the 
good that occupy the space of culture powerfully shape the resources that citizens who partake of 
the culture have available to them when forming, revising, and pursuing their own conceptions of 
the good. 
 
60 Selma James explains why culture cannot be narrowly delimited:  
The life-style unique to themselves which a people develop once they are enmeshed by 
capitalism, in response to and in rebellion against it, cannot be understood except as the 
totality of their capitalist lives. To delimit culture is to reduce it to a decoration of daily 
life. Culture is plays and poetry about the exploited; ceasing to wear mini-skirts and taking 
to trousers instead; the clash between the soul of Black Baptism and the guilt and sin of 
white Protestantism. Culture is also the shrill of the alarm clock that rings at 6 a.m. when 
a Black woman in London wakes her children to get them ready for the baby minder. 
Culture is how cold she feels at the bus stop and then how hot in the crowded bus. Culture 
is how you feel on Monday morning at eight when you clock in, wishing it was Friday, 
wishing your life away. Culture is the speed of the line or the weight and smell of dirty 
hospital sheets, and you meanwhile thinking what to make for tea that night. Culture is 
making the tea while your man watches the news on the telly. 
SELMA JAMES, SEX, RACE AND CLASS 13 (1975) 
61 Thus, “culture” in modern times could provide “the rickety shelter where the values and 
energies which industrial capitalism had no use for could take refuge . . . .” TERRY EAGLETON, 
AFTER THEORY 25 (2003). 
62 See Bourdieu, supra note 49, at 283. 
63 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 10. 
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 The public facility of culture is a limited space, as is politics, where “[n]ot everyone can 
speak at once, or use the same public facility at the same time for different purposes.”64 Public 
attention is a limited resource because humans have limited attention spans and can only take in 
so much information at a time. The limited nature of this space combined with its semi-
autonomy from economics and politics makes it likely that differences of wealth and status that 
are permissible under Rawls’s difference principle will be amplified. Wealth cannot be directly 
converted into academic credentials, professional reputation, and membership in networks of 
artists or authors, but it can facilitate the acquisition of these resources. In turn, these resources 
can provide their holders with an outsized voice in articulating conceptions of the good in the 
space of culture.65 
 The case of literature illustrates how representatives in the original position might 
understand culture to operate. In the domain of literature, “prestige is the quintessential form 
[that] power takes . . . the intangible authority unquestioningly accorded to the oldest, noblest, 
most legitimate (the terms being almost synonymous) literatures . . . .”66 Domination in “world 
literary space” exists in a variety of forms, including “linguistic, literary and political 
domination.”67 These three forms of domination “overlap, interpenetrate and obscure one another 
to such an extent that often only the most obvious form—political-economic domination—can be 
seen,”68 but because literature has its own non-economic measures of worth, literary domination 
differs from political and economic domination. Nobel Prizes in literature, for instance, are not 
 
64 Id. at 111. 
65 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY 11 (Chris Turner trans., 
2005).  
66 Pascale Casanova, Literature as a World, 31 NEW LEFT REV. 71, 83 (2005). 
67 Id. at 72, 86. 
68 Id. at 86. 
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awarded exclusively to authors from wealthy countries but are awarded exclusively to authors 
whose writing engages in a particular manner with a chain of canonized literature going back to 
writings produced several hundred years ago in the Rhine Valley.69 Because literary power can 
be accumulated semi-independently of economic and political power, inequalities permitted by 
Rawls’s difference principle can grow into intractable domination in literary space, allowing 
those individuals—like authors and editors—and entities—like the Nobel Prize committee—who 
control access to literary prestige to act as gatekeepers, determining who can and cannot 
contribute their expression to world literary space.70 
 I take the foregoing description of the economics of literary production to be sufficiently 
abstract to count as general knowledge about political sociology available to the parties in the 
original position. Likewise, it seems apparent that something like this account can be extended to 
visual art as well.71 Extending this theory of how bourgeois “high” art and literature operate to 
“low” cultural production is trickier. Does the production of, for instance, television 
programming allow individuals and institutions to accumulate power over time, gradually 
leading to the accentuation and exaggeration of inequalities? An optimistic view is taken by John 
Fiske, who argues that television is “a text of contestation which contains forces of closure and 
 
69 See id. at 74–75, 83. 
70 Such control is not just arbitrary; power can be accumulated in world literary space over time 
precisely because access to the literary center is determined by how literary texts relate to the 
existing world literary canon. If an author writes a novel that engages in the “right way” with the 
tradition that makes up the global literary center, the gatekeepers are supposed to grant the 
novelist admission, and they often actually do so. This is demonstrated by the entry of “post-
colonial” authors from Jean Rhys to Salman Rushdie into the world literary canon. This non-
arbitrary control is still a form of domination insofar as the standards for literary prestige are set 
by an elite cartel, rather than democratically. See PASCALE CASANOVA, THE WORLD REPUBLIC OF 
LETTERS 117–18 (M.B. DeBevoise trans., 2004). 
71 See BOURDIEU, supra note 59, at 40–41. 
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of openness and . . . allows viewers to make meanings that are subculturally pertinent to them 
. . . .”72 
Other cultural theorists, however, are not as sanguine about the “openness” of late 
capitalist cultural production. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno argue that the “culture 
industry” dominates the field of popular production, and that accumulations of capital are 
necessary to develop mass culture. 73 Only “those who are already part of the system or are co-
opted into it by the decisions of banks and industrial capital, can enter the pseudomarket [of 
culture] as sellers.”74 Liberties to write, to make music, or make movies are not worth the same 
amount to everyone. Some people are far better positioned to make use of these liberties than are 
others. 
 One may wonder whether technological developments in the past-half century, and 
especially the internet, have fragmented “the culture industry.” The development of networked 
information economies has increased the number of people who participate in cultural production 
and who can define what culture they consume and how they consume it.75 Nevertheless, 
contemporary cultural theorists suggest that in spite of technological changes in cultural 
production, it is still dominated by heavily capitalized institutional actors that aim to satisfy 
highly conventional consumer preferences.76 When the technological platforms on which cultural 
 
72 FISKE, supra note 13, at 239. 
73 MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAGMENTS 131 (Gunzelin Schmid Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 2002).  
74 Id. 
75 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 138–39 (2006). 
76 See ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED 
PROTEST 137 (2017); see also Jessa Crispin, Bookslut Was Born in an Era of Internet Freedom. 
Today’s Web Has Killed It, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2016, 8:50 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2016/may/16/bookslut-was-born-in-an-era-of-
internet-freedom-todays-web-has-killed-it (explaining that the literary website, Bookslut, closed 
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consumers and producers rely encourage users to create in a manner that is primarily lucrative 
for media corporations, the potentially “critical” cultural speech of users is reabsorbed into 
preexisting media models.77 
 Furthermore, historical and empirical scholarship suggests that the disruptive effects of 
innovations like the development of the internet on cultural production may be short lived. Tim 
Wu argues that innovations, including radio and film, initially disrupted culture industry 
incumbents but grew over time to be dominated by monopolists or cartels that centralized 
economic and cultural power.78 Bradi Heaberlin and Simon DeDeo argue that when Wikipedia 
began it was characterized by a decentralized, democratic system of editing, but over time a 
“leadership class with privileged access to information and social networks” emerged that relies 
on norms created early in Wikipedia’s existence and gradually institutionalized over time to 
sustain its power.79 These findings suggest that there is good reason to worry that even strongly 
 
because “[i]n order to make enough money to run a real publication [online], you have to write 
about books everyone has already heard of. You have to indulge in clickbait. You have to narrow 
your conversation down to the one that is already happening elsewhere. This reinforces the white 
male-dominated paradigm, where one type of voice is elevated above all others.”). 
77 See generally Eduardo Navas, Culture and Remix: A Theory of Cultural Sublation, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO REMIX STUDIES 102 (Eduardo Navas, Owen Gallagher & xtine 
burrough eds., 2015). 
78 TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 159–67 (2011). 
79 Jennifer Ouellette, Wikipedia Is Basically a Corporate Bureaucracy, According to a New 
Study, GIZMODO (Apr. 25, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://gizmodo.com/wikipedia-is-basically-a-
corporate-bureaucracy-accordi-1746955234 (quoting Simon DeDeo); Bradi Heaberlin & Simon 
DeDeo, The Evolution of Wikipedia’s Norm Network, FUTURE INTERNET, Apr. 20, 2016, at 1, 
available at https://www.mdpi.com/1999-5903/8/2/14/htm; see also Jinhyuk Yun, Sang Hoon 
Lee & Hawoong Jeong, Intellectual Interchanges in the History of the Massive Online Open-
Editing Encyclopedia, Wikipedia, 93 PHYSICAL REV. E 012307-1, 012307-9 (2016) (articles on 
English language Wikipedia that people are highly attracted to edit grow longer, which reduces 
the number of editors willing to participate and brings about inequality among the editors, which 
becomes more severe with time). 
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consumer-driven internet culture is susceptible to risks of centralization of gate-keeping power in 
the hands of a small number of corporations or individuals. 
 This description of culture as a limited space relies on a premise that culture is, in some 
respects, a competitive space. Scholars of culture do not universally accept this premise.80 
However, there is at minimum a meaningful risk of the centralization and de-democratization of 
cultural power even in societies with democratic political institutions and technologies, like the 
internet, that lower barriers to entry into the ranks of cultural producers. However, the basic 
structure of society is constituted, cultural space will tend to be limited because it, like politics, is 
a shared public facility. There is, therefore, a risk that cultural power will tend to accumulate in a 
few hands when moderate economic inequality is tolerated.81 
 The picture of culture as a limited and competitive space is crucial to establishing that 
semiotic justice is required by Rawls’s first principle. Anyone who denies that cultural power is 
distinct from underlying economic and political power is likely to think that any principle of 
political justice focused specifically on cultural liberties is superfluous. If cultural space does not 
systematically tend to allow accumulation of cultural power, then Rawls’s two principles may 
produce the best outcomes for cultural liberties that can be achieved in a democratic society 
without incorporating additional protections specifically for the cultural liberties. Those who 
reject the view of culture presented here might, however, agree that it is important to protect the 
 
80 See, e.g., Jonathan Riley, Defending Cultural Pluralism: Within Liberal Limits, 30 POL. 
THEORY 68, 78–91 (2002) (defending a liberal pluralist theory of culture). 
81 Cf. Daniels, supra note 32, at 257 (“If one thought that the mechanisms through which unequal 
wealth operates to destroy equal liberty were simple and insolatable, then perhaps constitutional 
provisions could be devised to solve the problem. Rawls . . . suggests constitutional provisions 
for the public funding of political parties and for the subsidy of public debate. . . . But there is 
little reason to believe that the mechanisms are so simple and that such safeguards would 
work.”). 
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fair value of the cultural liberties as a constitutional essential, for the reasons presented in the 
following section, but locate the rationale for doing so in the need to protect the fair value of the 
political liberties.  
2. Culture and the Good 
 Having established the “general commonsense facts” about culture that trustees in the 
original position possess, the second step in the argument for the proviso of semiotic justice is to 
establish that the shape of a culture is tightly connected to the ability of participants to form, 
revise, and pursue their own conceptions of the good. While the range of possible conceptions of 
the good is not strictly limited to the exact set of such conceptions in a culture in which one is 
born, the vast majority of conceptions of the good that persons exercising the second moral 
power will form over the course of a complete life will fall more or less in the range of 
conceptions of the good in the society or societies in which they live most of their lives.82 
Cognitive psychologists might describe this as the result of an availability heuristic.83 This 
availability may also harden, in certain circumstances, into something like “ideology,” 
systematically foreclosing particular conceptions of the good.84 Furthermore, culture is one of the 
vital fields in which conceptions of the good are presented, worked out, revised, and evaluated in 
public. 
 
82 See Talcott Parsons, The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory, 45 INT’L J. ETHICS 
282, 295–96 (1935); Ronald Fischer & Ype H. Poortinga, Are Cultural Values the Same as the 
Values of Individuals? An Examination of Similarities in Personal, Social and Cultural Value 
Structures, 12 INT’L J. CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 157, 165–66 (2012).  
83 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208–09 (1973). 
84 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda 
for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 542–43 (1982) (describing how “male power” acts as an ideological 
“myth that makes itself true”).  
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 One of the central insights of democratic theories of culture developed by intellectual 
property scholars is the claim that decisions about how to organize public cultural spaces deeply 
impact individuals’ ability to autonomously shape their own understandings of what a good life 
looks like.85 As Jack M. Balkin argues, “[p]articipation in culture is important because we are 
made of culture; the right to participate in culture is valuable because it lets us have a say in the 
forces that shape the world we live in and make us who we are.”86 Try as one might to make 
oneself independent from others, one’s ideas of what a good life looks like depend deeply on 
others.87 An individual can build on others’ ideas, but, at least for the vast majority of people, it 
is possible to diverge only so far from other people’s conception of the good. Certain forms of 
life appear as “necessary” or “impossible” because of settlement of both politics and culture.88  
 For instance, imagine a society in which almost all cultural expression expressed the 
beliefs that “the relation of male to female is that of natural superior to natural inferior”89 and 
that “a man’s and a woman’s courage and temperance differ.”90 If the cultural understanding of 
gender were thick enough, there would be no reason to see gendered differences in distribution 
as requiring any sort of special scrutiny. If the least advantaged members of a society turned out 
to be women, this would provide no reason for suspicion about the justice of the basic structure: 
from the standpoint of the hypothetical society, women are naturally ruled by men, so it should 
 
85 See Bracha & Syed, supra note 4, at 254–56. 
86 Balkin, supra note 4, at 6.  
87 See Frank I. Michelman, The Priority of Liberty: Rawls and “Tiers of Scrutiny,” in RAWLS’S 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 175, 188–89 (Thom Brooks & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2015) (noting the 
importance of “open access to the conversation of humankind distant and close” to the 
“formation, revision, and pursuit of an individual conception of the good. . . .”). 
88 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM UNBOUND 49 
(2007). 
89 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1254b13–15 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 1998).  
90 Id. at 1277b20.  
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not come as any surprise if most government offices are held by men. Furthermore, people might 
see this difference as advantageous for women: their temperaments are fundamentally different 
from those of men, and they do not benefit from offices that require them to lead public lives.91 
 In such a society, claims about gender would not present themselves as political claims. 
The political discourse of the hypothetical society could be completely devoid of any discussion 
of gender, and such claims would present themselves as “general commonsense facts of human 
psychology.”92 Perhaps Rawls’s political conception of the person in its articulation through the 
two principles of justice could solve much of this problem. The use of primary goods to measure 
welfare in the difference principle should guarantee women access to as many primary goods as 
men. Additionally, fair equality of opportunity will ensure that a system of “careers open to 
talents” prevails as part of the constitutional essentials and will ensure that women who wish to 
pursue the talents necessary for a career have access to the resources, like education, necessary to 
do so.93 The first principle will also guarantee that all of the basic liberties are, at the least, 
formally open to women as well as men.94 But ensuring that these liberties have their fair value 
to women seems much harder: women might not participate in public cultural expression, but, 
the hypothetical society might say, there is no reason that this is unfair; it simply reflects the 
lesser talent of women, who have the rights to write novels and act in plays but choose not to do 
so because of their feminine temperament or their lack of talent. If it so happens that, over time, 
it becomes harder and harder for women to participate in shaping the culture because networks 
 
91 See CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM 
CREATE DIFFERENCE 67–77 (2010) (describing and debunking such theories). 
92 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 101. 
93 See id. at 47 (“[S]ome principle of opportunity is a constitutional essential—for example, a 
principle requiring an open society, one with careers open to talents . . . .”). 
94 See id. at 167. 
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that control access to cultural production are controlled by men who share the background 
cultural beliefs about gender, this may be no cause for concern, because the people getting shut 
out from cultural production are the people with less talent. 
 Perhaps such an accumulation of power would violate fair equality of opportunity. But in 
a society that operated with a definition of “native endowments” that saw gender as part of one’s 
endowment of talent to accomplish particular aims, the hypothetical society’s interpretation of 
fair equality of opportunity might be permissible.95 
 The difference principle might require that women have other opportunities open to them, 
but this is possible in the hypothetical society. Women might, for instance, have opportunities to 
excel in domesticity that men do not have. At the legislative stage, when the legislators make 
complex inferences about social and economic facts, it is difficult to see how justice as fairness 
could exclude the cultural background that shapes beliefs about the reality of gender. The thick 
cultural belief about gender that I described applies equally to all domains of the hypothetical 
society. Women could participate in government in this society—and could even think of 
themselves as political equals of men—but could remain committed to the social inequality of 
men and women. 
 Now, perhaps this hypothetical society is not so bad; at the very least, with all of its 
constitutional safeguards in place, it looks like the sort of decent hierarchical society that Rawls 
thinks liberal societies should tolerate.96 However, it is hard to believe that such a society is 
 
95 For Rawls, fair equality of opportunity requires that, “supposing that there is a distribution of 
native endowments, those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness 
to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of 
origin . . . .” Id. at 44. 
96 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 62–70 (1999). 
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made up of free and equal citizens.97 This problem could be overcome with a constitutional 
guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties, clearly spelling out that the liberties of 
participating in culture must have roughly the same worth for all citizens. To avoid illegitimacy, 
all citizens must have a meaningful chance to challenge the culture that makes some social 
arrangements seem possible and others impossible. Any social arrangements that allow some 
citizens’ cultural contributions to be disregarded because they are disliked by a clique of non-
democratic elites, or because other citizens will not listen to the contributors’ ideas due to the 
contributors’ race, gender, class, or social position, fail to provide the fair equal access to culture 
needed for liberal legitimacy.98 
 If this picture of cultural power is correct, the ability of certain actors to accumulate 
cultural capital and exercise disproportionate power over the field of culture that prevents other 
citizens from participating in the give and take of cultural life, in turn prevents citizens from 
forming their own conceptions of the good. Because of the extent to which conceptions of the 
good are endogenous to the articulations of these conceptions in cultural space, in order to fully 
develop and realize the second moral power, citizens must be able to participate in shaping 
culture, expressing their conceptions of good in the shared facility of culture. 
3. A New Proviso and Its Meaning 
 
97 See Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHICS 23, 29 (1994); 
see also Justin Schwartz, Rights of Inequality: Rawlsian Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the 
Status of the Family, 7 LEGAL THEORY 83, 87 (2001). 
98 Rawlsian liberals might worry that such a requirement slides toward compelled listening. A 
constitutional guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties does not suggest that citizens 
must be legally compelled to listen to one another’s cultural contributions, as the constitutional 
essentials might be satisfied by a wide range of legal regimes. The suggestion made here is that 
citizens must not reject other citizens’ cultural contributions because of their gender, just as 
citizens must not refuse to vote for candidates for public office because of their gender. Cf. 
RAWLS, supra note 4, at 166 (“If the so-called private sphere is a space alleged to be exempt 
from justice, then there is no such thing.”). 
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 It is possible that access to cultural space will be distorted by otherwise-permissible 
inequalities in wealth, power, and prestige in much the same way that political space would be so 
distorted without Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties. Such a 
distortion will similarly undermine the capacities of the parties to social cooperation to develop 
the two moral powers, particularly the second, over the course of their lives. To address the 
possibility of such distortions, it is necessary for Rawlsian political theorists to modify the two 
principles of justice with an additional proviso of semiotic justice. The proviso of semiotic 
justice provides the following: 
(1) The worth of all cultural liberties to all citizens, whatever their economic or 
social position, must be sufficiently equal in the sense that all have a fair 
opportunity to contribute to public cultural expression and to affect the content of 
artistic, literary, media, and other cultural production.  
As with the proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties, this idea “parallels 
that of fair equality of opportunity in the second principle.”99 
(2) Furthermore, when the parties adopt the two principles of justice in the 
original position, they understand the first principle to include the proviso of 
semiotic justice. 
When integrated into Rawls’s account of justice, semiotic justice will lead to the inclusion in the 
first principle of justice of “a proviso that the equal political liberties [and the cultural liberties,] 
and only these liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.”100 
 
99 Id. at 149. 
100 Id. 
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 Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of political liberties insulates a democracy’s political 
life from non-political influences. It guards against political action that reflects inequalities of 
wealth or status rather than citizens’ considered judgments about how best to achieve justice.101 
Similarly, semiotic justice protects a democracy’s cultural life from unfair control by 
economically or politically powerful people. It insulates the judgments that citizens make about 
what is valuable or worthwhile in life from being shaped or unfairly influenced by inequalities of 
wealth or status that have nothing to do with citizen’s autonomous, non-instrumental judgments 
about the good. This is not to deny that cultural liberties and political liberties overlap. Similar 
basic liberties, including rights of freedom of conscience and expression, enable citizens to 
participate in both the political life and the cultural life of their communities.102 The novel 
feature of semiotic justice is that it protects the fair value of liberties that are not needed to 
realize the first moral power but are nevertheless needed to realize the second.103 
 There are two manners in which semiotic justice can be violated. First, semiotic justice is 
violated when attempts at cultural participation (e.g., submissions of manuscripts for publication, 
attempts to secure production money for screenplays, or efforts to sell records to consumers) are 
assessed other than on the basis of what individual citizens, in their role as primary evaluators of 
 
101 See id. at 51. 
102 See Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. L. REV. 1053, 
1054 (2016) (“Freedom of speech does more than protect democracy; it also promotes a 
democratic culture.”); see also RAWLS, supra note 4, at 169 (describing the role that free speech 
plays in the political life of liberal democracies). 
103 Rawls might note that our shared culture shapes our understanding of what social 
arrangements are politically possible. Therefore, respecting the fair value of the political liberties 
already requires guaranteeing the fair value of cultural liberties. On this interpretation, the fair 
value of the political liberties would entail exactly the same reform agenda as semiotic justice. 
While I would be happy with this outcome, I argue directly from the two moral powers to a 
guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties because I regard culture as semi-autonomous 
from politics and so regard this strategy as overly reductive in its description of culture. See 
supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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culture, believe to be culturally good or worthwhile.104 When some citizens cannot participate in 
cultural production because they hold a view of the good that diverges from the view of the good 
held by non-democratic gatekeepers—such as when elite networks of tastemakers whose views 
of the good do not represent those of typical citizens control access to cultural markets—access 
to the second moral power is compromised.105 
 Second, even in the absence of non-democratic gatekeepers, semiotic justice is violated 
when the access of some citizens to a cultural voice is foreclosed because other citizens refuse to 
entertain their proposed contributions to the culture on the basis of features that do not reflect 
their cultural talent and motivation, such as their race, gender, class, or social position.106 When 
citizens cannot have their voices heard about what a good culture looks like, not because others 
disagree with them about the nature of the good but because of who they are, the second moral 
power is compromised.107 Because the fair value of the cultural liberties can be compromised 
even in the absence of non-democratic gatekeepers, respecting the requirements of semiotic 
justice requires that citizens make their own autonomous judgements about the value of 
contributions to culture. Citizens must not outsource such judgments by relying on irrelevant 
 
104 This claim raises questions about how minority tastes get developed and published. See infra 
note 138 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of subcultural tastes in semiotic 
justice. 
105 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 18–19. 
106 Social position is defined here to encompass socially salient ideological commitments about 
the good that are associated with membership in or control of institutions that manage or restrict 
access to a society’s cultural space, like religion, as well as personal characteristics, like personal 
grooming, tone of voice, and physical appearance. Cf. Harris v. Capital Growth Inv’rs XIV, 805 
P.2d 873, 874, 883, 897 (Cal. 1991) (defining “personal characteristics”). 
107 This relies on a background claim that racist judgements are not judgements about what is 
non-instrumentally worthwhile but are instead instrumental actions, aimed at reinforcing social 
hierarchies and subordination. A Nietzschean white supremacist might insist that his racist 
dismissal of cultural contributions actually is a non-instrumental judgment about the good, 
because a white culture is non-instrumentally valuable, but such a racist is already far beyond the 
bounds of liberal reciprocity. See RAWLS, supra note 96, at 126. 
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social markers that bear no relationship to their own judgments about what is non-instrumentally 
good, like race or gender.  
 This is not to suggest that semiotic justice is violated simply by the fact that some people 
are popular or influential creators or critics of cultural goods. Just as Rawls’s fair value proviso 
is not violated simply because one person happens to have a better chance than another of being 
elected president because they are a more charismatic political speaker, semiotic justice is not 
necessarily violated if one person publishes a novel while another does not.108 Even if only a 
small number of people get their novels published or their movies produced, semiotic justice is 
not violated as long as the secondary markets through which those novels and films get made 
operate fairly.109 If citizens all had roughly the same opportunity to influence which novels are 
published then it would not be a problem from the standpoint of semiotic justice if one person 
could not get anyone to publish their novel. On the other hand, semiotic justice might be violated 
if only novelists who had already published, or only novelists who wrote in the style endorsed by 
a small, non-democratic cartel of publishers, could publish. If citizens all had roughly equal 
economic resources, they could vote with their pocketbooks for the sort of novels that they think 
are worthwhile. When secondary markets efficiently aggregate the autonomous cultural 
judgments of economically equal citizens, they can provide a mechanism for the democratic 
control of culture. If, on the other hand, such markets are controlled by cultural elites who do not 
respond to economic incentives, or if citizens possess greatly unequal economic resources, then 
secondary markets cannot, by themselves, provide for semiotic justice.110 
 
108 I owe this point to Seana Shiffrin (personal conversation). 
109 I owe this point to Robert D. Goldstein (personal conversation). 
110 It might be worried that semiotic justice will lead to a decimation of “high culture,” leading to 
an end to publicly supported art that is valuable but unpopular, since high concept poetry and 
avant-garde theater might be thought to have little “democratic appeal.” This concern is 
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 The fact that semiotic justice may be violated if publishers only accept novels from 
novelists who inhabit elite social circles or who write in the style that the cartel of publishers 
endorses as acceptable does not suggest that blind review by publishers should be legally 
mandated. The laws required to ensure semiotic justice need not include the direct legal 
regulation of how publishers make decisions about what to print. There are a range of 
institutional configurations that can provide the conditions for the fair value of cultural liberties. 
The legal apparatus used to guarantee semiotic justice could function by limiting accumulations 
of wealth that tend to produce inequalities of status and power over time, by ensuring more 
competition among publishers, or by sponsoring publicly funded presses that are controlled by 
democratically elected officials.111 At the same time, direct legal regulation of publishers’ 
decisions cannot be flatly excluded on the grounds of free speech, because the fair value of 
cultural liberties is as primary as are the other equal basic liberties. When these liberties conflict 
in particular cases, “their claims must be adjusted to fit into one coherent scheme of liberties.”112  
 Semiotic justice is neither exclusively about rights to participate in cultural production 
nor exclusively about rights to participate in cultural consumption. Semiotic justice aims to 
guarantee everyone a fair chance to have a say about the culture that they live in. Productive 
cultural activities, like writing poetry or making paintings, can obviously contribute to the shared 
 
misplaced because people can have different higher and lower order cultural preferences and can 
reflectively endorse the difference between the two. A reader can want complex fiction with 
temporally discontinuous narratives to be funded and produced even if, more often than not, they 
would rather read “trashy” science fiction. 
111 See Jen Kreder, Should Government Publish Books?, PRAWFSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2018, 9:45 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/02/should-government-publish-
books.html (arguing in favor of public sponsorship of university presses on the grounds that 
“[t]he impact of writing . . . is in the dissemination of the ideas expressed to an audience—now 
or in the future” and “[i]t is the rare self-published book that finds a significant audience.”). 
112 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 104. 
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culture that people inhabit. Consumptive choices also shape the culture, both by serving as a 
form of self-expression113 and by incentivizing the production of certain cultural goods by 
creating a market for them. A reader who purchases a novel helps to create a market for the 
novel and others of its kind, and if they form their own interpretations of the novel as they read 
it, they may then discuss their interpretation with their friends and thereby help to shape the 
cultural reception of the novel. Semiotic justice requires a rough equality of access to all culture-
shaping activities, both the productive and the consumptive, because these activities are the 
mechanisms through which individuals exchange views and coordinate with one another about 
conceptions of the good.114 
 Finally, semiotic justice is a statement of a constitutional essential that is integrated into 
the first principle of justice, rather than a clarification of the meaning of the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle, which apply to laws regulating culture in the 
legislative and judicial stages. The urgency of the cultural liberties is so great that they number 
among the constitutional essentials for a just society: if the fair value of liberties to contribute to 
public cultural expression and to affect the content of artistic, literary, media, and other cultural 
production is not guaranteed, citizens risk losing the opportunity to develop their second moral 
power, a risk that they must be unwilling to take, given Rawls’s political conception of the 
person.115 The constitutional essentials—those items necessary for a constitution to be 
legitimate—include the first principle of justice along with some narrow principle “requiring an 
 
113 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 567–68 (2004). 
114 However, because productive activities tend to shape culture more significantly than do 
consumptive activities, semiotic justice will tend to require that all citizens have roughly equal 
ability to participate in culture as producers, not just as consumers. 
115 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 105. 
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open society, one with careers open to talents” and a “social minimum providing for the basic 
needs of all citizens.”116 The principle of an open society and the social minimum are much 
narrower than the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle, 
respectively, but the first principle in its entirety forms a constitutional essential. That the proviso 
of semiotic justice is a constitutional essential is not the same as saying that it should be 
judicially enforceable, however.117 A constitution could include the proviso of semiotic justice, 
but this proviso might be accompanied by a “judges, keep out” sign leaving enforcement of the 
proviso up to the legislature, the executive, and the citizens themselves. 118 
 In many respects, the requirements of semiotic justice are similar to those of fair equality 
of opportunity. Fair equality of opportunity, like semiotic justice, requires that positions of 
cultural prestige be open to all who are equally talented and motivated to contribute to culture.119 
However, for Rawls, fair equality of opportunity is not part of the constitutional essentials of a 
liberal democracy, so it must give way when and if it comes into conflict with guaranteeing the 
 
116 Id. at 47–48. 
117 See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justification, in 
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21, 26 (Daphne Barak-Erez & 
Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007) (noting that some constitutional norms are meant to be fully binding 
and obligatory for officials to whom they apply even though “we do not expect or wish our 
judiciary to get too much mixed up with enforcing compliance” with them). 
118 See Lawrence Sager, Material Rights, Underenforcement, and the Adjudication Thesis, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 579, 580 (2010) (“[A] conscientious constitutional court will on some occasions 
stop short of fully enforcing the Constitution because of particular features of the judicial 
process, but . . . these institutional limitations on the judiciary do not mark the substantive 
boundaries of the Constitution.”); Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 203, 244 (2008); see also Rehan Abeyratne, Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian 
Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of Legitimacy, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2014) 
(discussing the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Indian constitution in the framework of 
Rawlsian constitutional theory). But see Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 1675 (arguing that the 
vagueness of fair value rights is often no worse for judicial enforcement than is the vagueness of 
formal equal basic liberties). 
119 See RAWLS, supra note 24, at 73 (“In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal 
prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed.”). 
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equal basic liberties of the first principle.120 Seana Shiffrin has argued that fair equality of 
opportunity should be included among the constitutional essentials, even if Rawls failed to 
explicitly locate it there.121 In Shiffrin’s view, “insulat[ing] access to employment and positions 
of power from the influence of morally arbitrary factors, such as race, gender, and class position” 
makes “perfect sense” given the moral interests of parties to democratic social cooperation.122 
The argument for semiotic justice is compatible with, yet distinct from, Shiffrin’s argument. 
While Shiffrin’s argument focuses on the connection between work and the formation and 
pursuit of conceptions of the good,123 semiotic justice focuses on the role that participating in 
culture, whether or not as part of one’s occupation, plays in realizing the moral powers.  
B. Objections 
 Rawls might offer three objections to the argument that a guarantee of the fair value of 
the cultural liberties must be added to his first principle of justice. This section considers and 
responds to each of these objections. 
1. Why Extend the Fair Value of Equal Basic Liberties Beyond Discrete Competitions? 
 In arguing that Rawls’s rationale for guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties 
also applies to the fair value of the cultural liberties, this article has assumed that Rawls’s 
proviso of the fair value of political liberties should be broadly interpreted to protect the exercise 
of these liberties in a wide range of settings where citizens pursue their conceptions of justice, 
including elections, formal and informal debates about policy proposals, and also public 
discussions about the proper aims of government.124 
 
120 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 47. 
121 Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 1672–73. 
122 Id. at 1653. 
123 Id. at 1666. 
124 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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 An alternative reading of Rawls’s proviso regards it as more narrowly focused on 
political contests, like elections, which are discrete events with clear winners and losers.125 
Under this reading, the purpose of the proviso is to insulate elections from the influence of 
money and so allow the outcomes of elections to be guided by citizens’ political commitments 
weighted roughly equally, rather than by the political commitments of the wealthiest or most 
powerful citizens.126 The “limited space of the public political forum” refers to the limited space 
of electoral discourse, where there are a small number of discrete options to be debated by 
citizens.127 This interpretation of Rawls’s proviso is attractive because the public facility 
consisting of elections and party politics is designed to “control the entry into positions of 
political authority,” and this facility needs protection to ensure that equal citizenship is not 
undermined over time.128  
Additionally, narrowing the scope of Rawls’s proviso prevents it from becoming 
unworkable. Because beliefs about justice connect with so many other aspects of life, protecting 
the fair value of the political liberties under the broad reading might require guaranteeing, as a 
matter of the constitutional essentials, the fair value of all of the equal basic liberties. While we 
might worry about violations of the fair value of basic political liberties in contexts other than 
elections, proponents of the narrow reading might argue, such violations are unlikely to cascade 
into entrenched advantage in the way that unfair control over electoral processes are. As long as 
the electoral processes remain fair, these processes can be used to reassert democratic control of 
 
125 See Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 1670–71. 
126 See id. at 1649. 
127 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 150. 
128 Id. at 149–50; see Robert C. Hughes, Responsive Government and Duties of Conscience, 5 
JURIS. 244, 245 (2014) (arguing that for a government to be democratic, “[c]itizens who regard 
the law as unjust and who diligently advance a sensible argument for changing it must be 
justified in believing that their efforts could, in time, help to bring about the change they seek.”). 
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other political institutions.129 If Rawls’s fair value proviso applies only to discrete political 
contests, it might be much less contentious than the proviso of semiotic justice, which cannot be 
limited in application to discrete contests because culture, for the most part, lacks contests with 
clear winners and losers. 
 In spite of its attractions, however, the narrow reading of Rawls’s fair value proviso 
should be rejected in favor of a broader understanding of the settings to which fair value applies. 
One aim of guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties “is to enable legislators and 
political parties to be independent of large concentrations of private economic and social power,” 
but the rationale for protecting the political liberties extends beyond elections.130 As donors 
seeking to influence elections have long realized, money can be used to help shape electoral 
outcomes even when it is not spent advocating for or against the election of particular candidates, 
but also when it is spent on ideological advocacy for certain political issues in the lead up to an 
election.131 
 If Rawls’s fair value proviso applies only to elections and other contest-like political 
activities, it could still be interpreted expansively to limit the role that money can play in 
electioneering issue ads meant to influence the outcomes of elections. However, even this 
interpretation is insufficiently broad. The outcomes of elections can be influenced more 
 
129 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 18–19 (2d ed. 1986). 
130 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 150; see Meena Krishnamurthy, Completing Rawls’s Argument for 
Equal Political Liberty and Its Fair Value: The Argument from Self-Respect, 43 CAN. J. PHIL. 
179, 199 (2013) (“[T]hough equal political liberty requires that equal voting rights are ensured, 
the fair value of political liberty requires more than this, that is, if each of those holding votes are 
to have equally effective influence over political decision-making.”). 
131 See Floyd Norris, A Fine Line Between Social and Political, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2013, at B1 
(noting that large numbers of “social welfare” nonprofits spent large amounts of money in the 
2012 presidential election on advertisements “to promote issues” that “did not actually back a 
candidate” so that they “could qualify as . . . nonpolitical issue advertisement[s]”). 
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indirectly. As Jane Mayer has documented, in the late twentieth-century United States, 
conservative organizations backed by wealthy donors sought to wage a battle of ideas to make 
libertarian free-market commitments more palatable to mainstream politicians.132 Sophisticated 
conservative foundations sought to affect political outcomes not just by influencing voters but by 
injecting their ideological stances into universities, think tanks, and nonprofits.133 Even if one 
rejects the empirical details of Mayer’s account of the influence of conservative foundations on 
American politics, the possibility that a democracy’s political culture can be reshaped by wealthy 
individuals or institutions suggests that the guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties 
should be expanded beyond elections and party politics. The exercise of the first moral power is 
just as imperiled by the possibility that a whole political culture can be influenced by money as 
by the possibility that elections can be influenced. Interpreting Rawls’s proviso to 
constitutionally guarantee the fair value of the political liberties in all the domains of life in 
which political values are collectively formulated and contested ensures that a democracy’s 
political culture cannot be compromised by the powerful.134 
 The broad interpretation of Rawls’s proviso advanced here still regards politics as a 
competition about political values, where succeeding at the competition means having one’s 
 
132 See generally JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES 
BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016). 
133 See id. at 93, 102, 156; see also JOHN J. MILLER, STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN IDEAS: HOW TWO 
FOUNDATIONS RESHAPED AMERICA 17 (2003), 
https://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/docs/default-source/guidebook-
files/how_two_foundations_reshaped_america1.pdf?sfvrsn=9891a740_0 (praising the John M. 
Olin foundation for its success at bringing about long-term change in the United States’ political 
culture by using its financial clout to establish “beachheads at the nation’s elite colleges and 
universities”). 
134 The domain of politics still has “limited space” under this interpretation because there is a 
limited amount of attention that the members of a community can devote to politics and justice. 
See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 150. 
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political values accepted by the community. Similarly, culture is a competition about access to a 
space that people pay attention to. In the limited public facility of culture, people compete to 
articulate their ideas of the good and of how best to live together.135 Just as the moral powers—
especially the first—would be compromised if money shaped the political ideas that a 
community collectively paid attention to, so too the second moral power would be compromised 
if a wealthy foundation or religious organization used its material resources to systematically 
alter a community’s beliefs about the good. To avoid this possibility, democracies should 
embrace the proviso of semiotic justice.  
 Of course, political communities do not inescapably coordinate about the good, as they 
must coordinate about the right and about government. However, in a community that is 
committed to ensuring that everyone has an equal opportunity to form their own values and 
judgments of the good, some degree of coordination about the good is required to ensure that 
arbitrary entitlements do not leave some citizens with a much greater chance than others to form 
their own conception of the good. For this reason, semiotic justice might be understood to 
require modifications to Rawls’s political conception of the person. For Rawls, the person is 
conceptualized as a free rational person reaching agreement with other free rational persons and 
is understood to reach reciprocal agreement as a citizen with other citizens.136 The reciprocal 
 
135 Claiming that culture is a competition is not to suggest that culture is merely a struggle for 
elevated social recognition or for fame. The contest of culture involves taking up existing 
cultural materials and amplifying, transforming, or destroying them. Culture is competitive 
because our views of the good life are typically about a good life together with other people 
rather than alone in the wilderness, and because the cultural resources that we take up and 
transform are shared resources. As success in the competitive space of politics is marked not by 
achieving power but by achieving one’s conception of justice, so success in the competitive 
space of culture is marked not by achieving fame but by achieving one’s conception of the good. 
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
136 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 16. 
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cooperation that the members of a cooperating society agree upon is cooperation as citizens. 
Elevating cultural liberties to the level of a constitutional essential reflects a concern with 
something other than citizenship; now a commitment to creating a space in which people can 
pursue and revise conceptions of the good with each other is on par with the political aims of 
Kantian persons.137 Rawls’s account of the parties to the original position as reciprocal 
cooperators might still be sustained, but the reciprocity cannot be simply reciprocity as citizens. 
 One might yet wonder whether culture requires the same sort of connection to the state 
that politics does: because of the role of the basic structure in allocating scarce resources and 
regulating interpersonal relationships, the first moral power cannot be pursued in isolation in a 
small enclave cut off from the state. Perhaps the second moral power, in contrast to the first, can 
be realized in a subculture or a dissident culture that is largely disconnected from mainstream 
politics and culture.138 However, because pursuing a conception of the good typically requires 
access to material resources (cameras to make movies and the like), cultural source material to 
work with, and the capacity to impact others, the space of culture cannot be strictly segregated 
from the space of politics.139 Furthermore, while affordances to participate in subcultures provide 
a way of exercising the second moral power, subcultural creation does not happen in a vacuum. 
The broader culture helps to shape what conceptions of the good are thinkable and unthinkable, 
 
137 RAWLS, supra note 24, at 445 (“[T]he Kantian interpretation of the original position means 
that the desire to do what is right and just is the main way for persons to express their nature as 
free and equal rational beings.”). 
138 See PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC: MODERNITY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 7 
(1993); PAUL C. TAYLOR, BLACK IS BEAUTIFUL: A PHILOSOPHY OF BLACK AESTHETICS 14–15 
(2016). 
139 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 114 (“[A] sufficient material basis for personal independence and 
a sense of self-respect . . . are essential for the adequate development and exercise of the moral 
powers.”). 
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even for the avant-garde.140 As soon as the state is involved in shaping the broad cultural 
landscape by creating schools and universities, regulating school curricula, and funding the arts, 
humanities, and sciences, the possibility of cordoning culture off from politics is lost. 
2. Why Make Semiotic Justice a Constitutional Essential? 
 Rawls might respond to semiotic justice by arguing that there is no need to turn this 
additional proviso into a constitutional essential. The fair value of the political liberties is a 
constitutional essential because of the usefulness of these liberties in making the whole basic 
structure function effectively and justly.141 Rawls might highlight four features of justice as 
fairness: first, guarantees in the first principle of freedom of conscience; second, the likelihood 
that there would be some overlap in practice between semiotic justice and the guarantee of the 
fair value of the political liberties; third, the difference principle; fourth, the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity operating at the legislative stage.142 Rawls might ask why this set of 
factors is not good enough to ensure that the cultural liberties have their fair value. These 
guarantees, Rawls might insist, suffice to ensure that everyone has the best chance to participate 
in culture that they possibly could have, consistent with the other requirements of justice. For 
instance, fair equality of opportunity is precisely about the equal opportunity to fully and 
adequately develop and exercise the first and second moral powers.143 Fair equality of 
opportunity would, therefore, likely require the legislature to adopt antitrust-like laws designed 
to counteract accumulations of cultural power. What difference does it make to put this into the 
constitution, rather than to leave it to the legislative stage? 
 
140 See ROSALIND E. KRAUS, THE ORIGINALITY OF THE AVANT GARDE AND OTHER MODERNIST 
MYTHS 162 (1986). 
141 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 28. 
142 See id. at 44, 47, 61, 148. 
143 Id. at 20. 
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 To understand the importance of constitutionalizing semiotic justice, consider why Rawls 
insists that the fair value proviso for the equal political liberties needs to be part of the first 
principle, rather than postponed to the legislative stage. Rawls suggests that the political liberties 
are of special importance, because “unless the fair value of these liberties is approximately 
preserved, just background institutions are unlikely to be either established or maintained.”144 By 
guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties at the outset, before the legislative stage is 
reached, a society can ensure that everyone will be able to fairly participate in the legislative 
process.145 If all citizens are able to have their voices heard by the legislature, this will ensure 
that “the [other] basic liberties are not merely formal.”146 Like Chief Justice Warren’s description 
of the right to vote freely as “preservative of other basic civil and political rights,”147 or John 
Hart Ely’s advocacy of “a representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review” that supports 
“the underlying premises of the American system of representative democracy,”148 the fair value 
of the equal political liberties is particularly urgent because it makes the political system work, 
which in turn ensures that the other basic liberties will be realized. The legislative stage cannot 
take care of the fair value of the political liberties if access to that stage is not itself fair. The 
reasons for treating the proviso of the fair value of the political liberties as part of the first 
principle, and hence as part of the constitutional essentials, boils down to the claim that it is 
“more urgent to settle” the fair value of the political liberties than of the other basic liberties.149 
 
144 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 327–28. 
145 Id. at 330. 
146 Id. 
147 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).  
148 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88 (1980). 
149 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 49.  
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 My response to this objection has two parts. First, as I have argued above, the contours of 
culture shape what is politically possible. As the hypothetical society shot through with sex 
inequality that I describe above illustrates, an undemocratic culture can undermine the conditions 
necessary for democratic politics.150 
 Second, the fair value of the cultural liberties is particularly urgent because guaranteeing 
such liberties creates the conditions necessary for political philosophy to do its work. The 
political philosophizing that gives rise to the political conception of the person is worked up 
from the “public political culture of a democratic society, in its basic political texts (constitutions 
and declarations of human rights), and in the historical tradition of the interpretation of those 
texts.”151 If there are blind spots in the historical traditions in which justice as fairness goes to 
work, justice as fairness is likely to suffer from similar oversights.152  
However, a commitment to making culture open and to allowing the conditions against 
which political philosophy grows up to be contested by all of the people of a cooperating society, 
provides an avenue to address these oversights. Interventions in culture can bring to light 
previously unrecognized ways of life,153 providing resources with which individuals may 
develop their conceptions of the good and showing philosophers where political philosophy 
should play its “realistically utopian” role, “probing the limits of practical political 
 
150 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
151 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 19. 
152 One piece of evidence for this claim is that Rawls’s theory of justice has frequently been 
criticized for failing to pay sufficient attention to global justice, see, e.g., THOMAS W. POGGE, 
WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 104–08 
(2002), women’s rights, see, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished 
Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (2004), and disability, see, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Capabilities and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens, 30 PHIL. TOPICS 133 
(2002), all topics that have historically been overlooked in the history of elite American political 
discourse. 
153 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 94 (1989). 
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possibility.”154 Cultural participation is the sort of expression that creates the conditions of 
awareness that political philosophy can then work to incorporate, seeking out voices that cannot 
be understood in the realm of political philosophy unless they are first articulated in cultural 
space. For instance, Julie Cohen discusses how the “to and fro” play of culture, which is “neither 
entirely random nor wholly ordered . . . supplies the unexpected inputs to creative processes, 
fuels serendipitous consumption by situated users, and inclines audiences toward the new.”155 
The unpredictability of culture’s movements in response to inputs provides a further resource for 
destabilizing and rethinking political theory. 
 Guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural liberties is of similar urgency to guaranteeing 
the fair value of the political liberties because the cultural background against which politics 
works, and which informs its conception of the person, determines what sort of institutional 
arrangements appear reasonable from the perspective of politics. Guaranteeing the fair value of 
the cultural liberties ensures that the ability to develop and pursue conceptions of the good is a 
real opportunity to do so, rather than merely an opportunity to endorse the prevailing conceptions 
of the good in a cooperative society. 
3. Is Semiotic Justice Socially Divisive? 
 A third objection to semiotic justice is that guaranteeing the fair value of basic liberties 
other than the equal political liberties is socially divisive because it requires committing to a 
particular conception of the good.  
 To the contrary, semiotic justice does not articulate a preference for certain conceptions 
of the good over others within the space of culture that it opens up. This is not to say that 
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155 Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 
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semiotic justice is indifferent among all possible conceptions of the good; it excludes 
conceptions of the good that require a closed or static culture.156 However, within the space of 
permissible cultural contestation, semiotic justice need not make controversial suppositions 
about the good life. Semiotic justice does not assume that participating in culture is necessarily 
an important and valuable part of individuals’ lives, but instead supposes that citizens who wish 
to pursue their own conception of the good need a cultural environment that is conducive to that 
pursuit.157 Justice as fairness identifies certain “worthy” forms of life and provides sufficient 
space within itself for those ways of life while also excluding other forms of life.158 This is 
permissible for Rawls because the exclusion of some ways of life is based on a political 
conception of justice that is, “or could be, shared by citizens generally regarded as free and 
equal” and “do[es] not presuppose any particular fully (or partially) comprehensive doctrine.”159 
Semiotic justice’s preferences for certain forms of life are likewise rooted in the political 
conception of the person as having the first and second moral powers, rather than in any 
commitment to a particular comprehensive conception of the good. Semiotic justice sets up a 
space of culture, and while it may foreclose the development of conceptions of the good outside 
of that space, it commits to allowing all of the different conceptions of the good that are able to 
fit within that space to play out against one another. 
III. SEMIOTIC JUSTICE AND LAW 
 
156 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
157 Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 1667 (advancing a similar argument that guaranteeing the fair 
equality of opportunity in employment does not rely on “controversial assumptions about the 
nature of the good for individuals”). 
158 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 155 n.30. 
159 Id. at 141. 
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 This article has argued that, given several plausible descriptive assumptions about the 
political economy of culture, Rawls’s first principle of justice must guarantee semiotic justice.160 
Just as the fair value of the political liberties is among the constitutional essentials of a liberal 
society governed by justice as fairness, so too is the fair value of the cultural liberties. This 
emendation of the first principle is necessary to constitutionally guarantee that a nation’s culture 
is controlled democratically, rather than by the wealthy or the powerful. In this Part, I turn to the 
question of what it means, in practice, to respect the fair value of the cultural liberties.  
 Adding items to Rawls’s list of constitutional essentials is no simple matter, for Rawls’s 
first principle requires not that each person have a right to each of the equal basic liberties but 
that each person have a right to “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties” that is 
compatible with everyone else having the same scheme of liberties.161 The items included among 
the constitutional essentials may trade off with one another and are treated as equally significant 
when they come into conflict.162 Any resolution of practical conflicts among the constitutional 
essentials that maintains a scheme of constitutional essentials that is as conducive as possible to 
every citizen’s realization and development of the moral powers and that satisfies the demands of 
public reason meets the requirements of constitutional legitimacy.163 Thus, it does not 
immediately follow from adding the fair value of cultural liberties to the list of constitutional 
essentials that a political community’s laws must be revised in order to be legitimate. To 
determine what revisions to a partially just society’s laws and political institutions would satisfy 
 
160 See supra Section II(A)(1)–(2). 
161 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 42–43 (emphasis added). 
162 See id. at 149. But see Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 1672 (arguing that “the idea that whether 
something is a constitutional essential or not is co-extensive with its place in the system of 
lexical priority” may be mistaken). 
163 Michelman, supra note 87, at 195. 
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the requirements of semiotic justice, one must consider whether the totality of the society’s laws 
adequately enable citizens to develop the two moral powers by providing them with a scheme 
that includes the each of the formal equal basic liberties, a basic social minimum, the fair value 
of the political liberties, and the fair value of cultural liberties, where all of these liberties are 
regarded as equally significant.164  
 Like justice as fairness, the constitutional requirements of semiotic justice are multiply 
realizable.165 For this reason, the significance of semiotic justice for constitution-making, 
legislating, and adjudication can best be understood by examining cases that present failures of 
semiotic justice and considering the reforms that might bring a constitutional order into 
compliance with the requirements of justice as fairness, generally, and the semiotic justice 
proviso, specifically. Three cases are presented that illustrate failures of semiotic justice and 
discuss the range of policy reforms that might bring the constitutional order elucidated by each 
of these cases more closely into alignment with the requirements of semiotic justice. These cases 
highlight the range of disparate laws and institutions that play a role in guaranteeing or 
undermining the fair value of the cultural liberties. Together, these cases show how the 
requirements of semiotic justice intersect not only with constitutional law, but also with features 
of private law that often appear politically “neutral.” A full evaluation of the reforms surveyed in 
response to each of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, as is an assessment of the 
 
164 Here, I follow Frank Michelman in regarding not only written constitutions but also the 
“governmental totality” of “the entire aggregate of concrete political and legal institutions, 
practices, laws, and legal interpretations currently in force or occurrent in the country” as 
potentially relevant to assessing the legitimation-worthiness of a society’s constitution. Frank I. 
Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 345, 347 (2003). 
165 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 138 (noting that the principles of justice can be satisfied in a 
range of economic regimes, including both “property-owning democracy” and “liberal 
socialism”). 
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reforms’ political feasibility; rather, the aim is to model how semiotic justice provides a 
“template against which to assess our achievements” and “a norm against to which to assess 
what we have neglected and failed to protect.”166 
A. #OscarsSoWhite: Race Discrimination and Cultural Accolades 
 In 2016, for the second year in a row, exclusively white actors were nominated for Oscar 
awards by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences. A significant number of critically 
acclaimed films with minority directors and notable performances by black actors were eligible 
for the 2016 Oscars, including Creed, Straight Outta Compton, Chi-raq, and Beasts of No 
Nation.167 Straight Outta Compton, directed by and starring African-Americans but written by a 
team of white screenwriters, was nominated only for Best Original Screenplay.168 Protestors 
objected that the mono-racial Oscar nominations failed to honor the contributions of minority 
actors, directors, and writers to cinema in 2015.169 The complaint of protestors was not that the 
Academy violated state or federal antidiscrimination laws, nor did actors and filmmakers who 
boycotted the awards ceremony seek interventions from lawmakers or politicians to address 
discrimination in Oscar nominations.170 Nonetheless, the phenomenon of #OscarsSoWhite 
represents a failure of semiotic justice. 
 
166 Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty 
Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2007). 
167 Gray, supra note 1. 
168 See id. 
169 Jack Shepherd, Oscars 2016: Everyone Who Boycotted the Academy Awards and Why, from 
Jada Pinkett Smith to Spike Lee, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 28, 2016, 21:47 GMT), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/oscars-2016-everyone-boycotting-
the-academy-awards-and-why-from-jada-pinkett-smith-to-spike-lee-a6902121.html; Ng, supra 
note 1. 
170 See Ng, supra note 1. 
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 To see why the fact that the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences nominated 
exclusively white actors for Academy Awards in 2015 and 2016 provides prima facie evidence 
of a failure of the constitutional order of the United States to guarantee the fair value of the 
cultural liberties, several additional premises are required. First, the Academy Awards serve as 
the most visible institutional gatekeeper of cinematic prestige in the United States.171 Such 
prestige is connected to, but partially independent from, the economics of the film industry. For 
instance, the Academy does not simply respond to economic indicators when deciding which 
films and performances to nominate for Oscars—in fact, the films that make the most money at 
the box office often are not considered “Oscar material.”172 Winning or being nominated for an 
Oscar can help a film sell tickets, but these accolades also provide a special sort of cultural 
recognition and canonization for films, making it more likely that audiences and other 
filmmakers will pay attention to and be influenced by a film.173 In this institutional and cultural 
context, mono-racial Oscar nominations constitute a failure of semiotic justice because the 
decision of the Academy not to nominate African-American filmmakers or actors both provides 
evidence of and causally contributes to the inability of minority filmmakers—relative to white 
filmmakers—to participate in shaping American cinematic culture. 
 
171 See, e.g., Colleen Kennedy-Karpat, Trash Cinema and Oscar Gold: Quentin Tarantino, 
Intertextuality, and Industry Prestige, in ADAPTATION, AWARDS CULTURE, AND THE VALUE OF 
PRESTIGE 173, 187 n.2 (Colleen Kennedy-Karpat & Eric Sandberg eds., 2017) (treating 
Academy Awards as the primary marker of prestige in Hollywood). 
172 See K.K. Rebecca Lai & Jasmine C. Lee, Box Office Hit or Best Picture at the Oscars? You 
Can Rarely Have Both, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/03/movies/oscars-best-picture-box-office.html 
(“Hit movies rarely go on to become Oscar best picture winners, reflecting a difference in taste 
between moviegoers and film industry professionals. In the past 30 years, only four movies were 
named best picture while topping box office charts.”). 
173 See Colleen Kennedy-Karpat & Eric Sandberg, Adaptation and Systems of Cultural Value, in 
ADAPTATION, AWARDS CULTURE, AND THE VALUE OF PRESTIGE, supra note 171, at 1, 5. 
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 It may be objected that no state action is involved—the Academy is a private association, 
conferring private honors—and so it is inapt to describe its failings as failings of justice. It might 
further be objected that even if the Academy’s failings are failings of justice, they cannot affect 
the legitimacy of the United States’ constitutional order.  
 While the Academy is indeed a private association, this is not enough to settle the 
question of whether its decisions in nominating films for Oscars can count as a failure of justice. 
The Academy’s actions constitute one small part of the basic structure and thus only constitute a 
small part of the failure of semiotic justice in this case.174 It is not the failure of the Academy by 
itself that constitutes a failure of constitutional legitimacy, but the total arrangement of laws and 
political institutions that make it possible for the Academy to exercise a great deal of 
gatekeeping power over cinematic prestige together with the revealed preference of the 
Academy’s members to exclude minority actors from access to the prestige-conferring Oscars. 
Even if the Academy is not part of the basic structure, the failure of the Academy to nominate 
minority actors provides evidence of a failure by the state to respect semiotic justice. A culture in 
which minority actors and filmmakers do not have fair equal access to the main markers of 
cultural prestige in the film world is a culture that fails at reciprocity, and failures of reciprocity 
indicate that a constitutional order is illegitimate.175  
 
174 Some of the most prominent actors and filmmakers to boycott the 2016 Oscars, including 
Jada Pinkett-Smith and Spike Lee, invoked the memory of Martin Luther King in explaining 
their decision to boycott. See Shepherd, supra note 169. King, whose campaigns served as an 
exemplary touchstone for Rawls’s conceptions of justice as fairness and political liberalism, 
targeted economic elites, social organizations like churches, and ordinary citizens “because he 
conceived of justice as a virtue of persons and civil society, as well as the state or the ‘basic 
structure’ of society.” Brandon M. Terry, Critical Race Theory and the Tasks of Political 
Philosophy: On Rawls and “The Racial Contract” 29 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
the author). As King recognized, the basic structure of society is inextricable from the 
organization of private institutions and the dispositions of private citizens. See id. 
175 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 137. 
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 Consider the following three reforms that the legal and political institutions of the United 
States (e.g., Congress, legislatures, state and federal courts, and state and federal agencies) could 
implement in response to #OscarsSoWhite in order to bring the American constitutional order 
closer to legitimation-worthiness. 
 First, Congress and state legislatures or state and federal courts could extend anti-
discrimination laws to prohibit racial discrimination in the provision of offices and awards held 
out to the public as honors to be respected.176 Congress and state legislatures could, at the same 
time, modify anti-discrimination laws to allow disparate impact—rather than disparate 
treatment—to establish a violation of these laws.177 This strategy would aim to ensure that the 
Oscars honor more diverse filmmakers and actors in order to avoid liability for violating state or 
federal anti-discrimination law. 
 
176 For instance, California could amend its Unruh Civil Rights Act, which states that all persons 
are “entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services 
in all business establishments of any kind whatsoever” regardless of their race. CAL. CIV. CODE § 
51(b) (Deering 2019). The California legislature could add a clause entitling all persons to full 
and equal privileges from “all organizations offering offices and awards that are held out to the 
public as honors to be respected.” Alternatively, the California courts could interpret “all 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever” to include the Academy of Motion Picture 
Arts and Sciences’ Academy Awards and interpret “full and equal . . . privileges” to include 
nomination and selection for Academy Awards. 
177 See Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1135–36 (2010) (describing 
the importance of disparate impact claims); see also Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: 
Diluting Disparate Impact and Redefining Disparate Treatment, 628 NEV. L.J. 626, 629–35 
(2012) (describing the distinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment in 
contemporary federal anti-discrimination law). 
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 Second, the federal or state governments could provide a universal basic income,178 
institute more progressive property and income taxes,179 provide reparations for slavery to the 
descendants of slaves,180 and increase investments in arts and humanities education in public 
schools and universities so that the writing and artistic skills needed to contribute to film are 
more widely accessible.181 This suite of reforms would aim to change the behavior of the 
Academy Awards indirectly. By helping to equalize the purchasing power of minority and white 
movie audiences, these wealth transfers would address the possibility that the decision of the 
Academy to honor predominantly white filmmakers reflects audience preferences, with white 
audiences exercising disproportionate influence because of their greater disposable incomes that 
enable them to spend more on movie tickets, rentals, and purchases. 
 Third, Congress could establish and fund a National Endowment for Film with a mandate 
to honor and promote excellence in the cinematic arts and directions to establish an annual 
awards program for excellence in filmmaking and acting.182 This strategy would aim not to 
change the behavior of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences but instead to change 
the Academy’s role in the culture of the contemporary United States, displacing it as the primary 
gatekeeper of cinematic prestige so that its failure to honor minority actors would not prevent 
 
178 See PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS & YANNICK VANDERBORGHT, BASIC INCOME: A RADICAL PROPOSAL 
FOR A FREE SOCIETY AND A SANE ECONOMY 5–28 (2017) (articulating a concrete proposal for 
implementing a universal basic income). 
179 See Thomas Piketty, Property, Inequality, and Taxation: Reflections on Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century, 68 TAX L. REV. 631, 638–41 (2015); see also C. Ronald Chester, 
Inheritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 62, 66–72 (1976). 
180 See BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 8–29 (2d ed. 2003); see also 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 294–308 (2003). 
181 See STEFAN COLLINI, SPEAKING OF UNIVERSITIES 193–205 (2017). 
182 Cf. FISHER, supra note 13, at 200 (discussing direct government funding for the production of 
public goods). 
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minority actors from having a roughly equal opportunity to participate in the shared culture. This 
reform strategy would not render a failure of the Academy to honor diverse actors morally 
permissible, but it would help to establish a more legitimate constitutional order. 
 These three reform strategies demonstrate how semiotic justice, like justice as fairness 
more generally, is multiply realizable: there are different points of intervention in the legal-
constitutional schema, each of which would have a somewhat different effect on the legitimacy 
of the constitution. Because semiotic justice elevates the fair value of the cultural liberties to the 
level of a constitutional essential, the fair value of the cultural liberties has the same priority as 
the formal basic liberties, including the right to free speech.183 The first reform option mentioned 
above, which involves expanding anti-discrimination law to directly regulate the Academy’s 
decisions of which movies to honor, might be objected to on the grounds that it interferes with 
the Academy’s freedom of speech (or with the freedom of speech of its members). However, 
because the formal liberty of free speech and the fair value of the cultural liberties both number 
among the constitutional essentials according to semiotic justice, this objection is not decisive. In 
Rawls’s view, the Supreme Court erred in Buckley v. Valeo when it struck down the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971’s limits on election spending as violating the First 
Amendment.184 While the limits on election spending restricted the formal liberty of free speech, 
such limits advanced the fair value of the equal political liberties by ensuring that citizens have 
roughly equal opportunities to influence electoral outcomes, regardless of wealth.185  
 
183 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 46–47, 104–06. 
184 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976); RAWLS, supra note 6, at 359–63. 
185 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 449; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23. Because the equal basic liberties 
should be understood in association with one another, the point might also be put in another way: 
on the best understanding of the formal liberty of free speech, the right of free speech does not 
include a right to make unlimited campaign expenditures. A right to free speech that does not 
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Likewise, treating the formal liberty of free speech as settling the question of whether the 
Academy’s decisions of which films to honor can be regulated by anti-discrimination laws would 
be to privilege formal rights over other rights—namely, the fair value of the cultural liberties—
that are equally important for the two moral powers. Restricting the formal free speech rights of 
the Academy might be precisely what is needed to ensure that citizens have roughly equal 
opportunities to accrue cinematic prestige and recognition. On the other hand, the formal liberty 
of free speech might require that the second or third reform strategy be adopted instead of the 
first, at least insofar as the first strategy restricts freedom of expression that is valuable for the 
first and second moral powers.186 The different reform strategies that I have sketched entail 
different baskets of formal basic liberties and substantive political and cultural liberties; settling 
on which reform schemes semiotic justice endorses requires determining which schemes, if any, 
adequately guarantee access to all the equal basic liberties. 
 Fair equality of opportunity would propose exactly the same sort of legal reforms that 
semiotic justice suggests, except that the legal reforms proposed by the fair equality of 
opportunity might be more tightly constrained by the need to respect the formal equal basic 
liberties, including the freedom of speech. However, Rawls’s principle of fair equality of 
opportunity fails to treat the case of #OscarsSoWhite as involving the issue of legitimacy.187 This 
is a mistake on Rawls’s part, because, like the fair value of the equal political liberties, the fair 
value of the cultural liberties is a field in which the failure of reciprocity can have widespread 
 
include such a right to make campaign expenditures is not a “compromised” formal right of free 
speech—it is simply the best understanding of the meaning of free speech. 
186 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 41, 45. 
187 See, e.g., THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 164–65 (1989). Shiffrin’s reading of fair 
equality of opportunity is a notable exception. Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 1660. 
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downstream effects, infecting our very ability to theorize a good culture.188 Furthermore, while 
the #OscarsSoWhite case concerns discrimination along the lines of a protected category (i.e., 
race), semiotic justice demands equal access on the ground of the right at issue, rather than on 
the basis of the classification that forms the basis for the discrimination. In this sense, the 
constitutional question posed by semiotic justice is more one of “fundamental rights” than one of 
“suspect classifications” in the vocabulary of American constitutional jurisprudence.189 
B. Copyright Law and Appropriation Art 
 The following cases about an appropriation artist will help to further distinguish the 
reform agenda of semiotic justice from that of Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity:190 
Morgan, a semi-professional Los Angeles artist, creates a screen-printed T-Shirt 
riffing on an iconic photograph of a surfer catching a wave, taken a decade ago by 
Quinn, one of Morgan’s favorite professional photographers. Morgan uses a digital 
image of the photograph as a reference image when she designs her T-shirt but 
modifies it heavily, removing much of the detail present in the photograph and 
adding visual elements that call attention to what Morgan regards as the typically 
overlooked influence of punk rock on Quinn’s photographic aesthetic, as well as 
other images and text referring to the history of street art in Los Angeles. Morgan 
makes twenty copies of the T-shirt and sells half of them, for thirty dollars each, at 
a semi-commercial street-art festival. Quinn happens to attend the festival and sees 
Morgan’s T-shirt; the following day, Quinn’s attorney contacts Morgan demanding 
that she cease production of the T-shirts, destroy her existing inventory, and turn 
over her profits plus a $5,000 licensing payment to Quinn. Morgan believes that 
her T-shirt constitutes a fair use of Quinn’s image,191 but after speaking with a 
lawyer, she learns that determining whether her T-shirt is a fair use is a fact-
intensive inquiry that would likely be settled only after discovery if Quinn were to 
 
188 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
189 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (striking down a law prohibiting inter-
racial marriage on the basis of both the suspect nature of racial classifications and a fundamental 
right to marry). 
190 Appropriation art “takes over pre-existing images to re-employ them unchanged in a different 
context or with a different purpose in mind, thus altering [their] meaning.” EDWARD LUCIE-
SMITH, THE THAMES & HUDSON DICTIONARY OF ART TERMS 17 (2d ed. 2004); see also SIMON 
WILSON & JESSICA LACK, THE TATE GUIDE TO MODERN ART TERMS 20–21 (1st ed. 2008) 
(offering a similar definition of appropriation art but noting that appropriation can involve not 
just existing works of art but any “real object”). 
191 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2017) (fair use provision of U.S. copyright law). 
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sue.192 Moreover, she learns that if a court determined that her T-shirt were not a 
fair use, Quinn could be awarded both a disgorgement of her (miniscule) profits 
and statutory damages, perhaps in the tens of thousands of dollars, if it proved 
difficult for him to establish actual damages.193 Quinn might even be awarded 
attorney’s fees and costs, on top of damages.194 Morgan believes that there is a 
ninety percent likelihood that she would prevail at trial on a fair use defense, but 
because of the cost of retaining a lawyer and the risk of losing a trial and being 
bankrupted, Morgan decides she does not want to chance it.195 She offers to license 
the image from Quinn for a reasonable fee, and even to turn over all profits from 
the shirt to Quinn, since she is more concerned about disseminating her art than 
making money from it. But Quinn refuses to entertain the possibility of a license, 
telling Morgan, through his attorney, “I decide when and where my art gets 
displayed. Anyway, punk is a crap aesthetic and I want nothing to do with it.” 
Feeling that she has no other choice, Morgan negotiates a settlement with Quinn’s 
lawyer, agreeing to cease production of her T-shirt, destroy her inventory, turn over 
all of her profits from selling the shirt, and issue a public apology.196 
 
 This case might initially seem less like a violation of semiotic justice than the case of 
#OscarsSoWhite. In the Oscars case, Academy members failed to take minority actors and 
filmmakers seriously as contributors to cinematic culture: where reciprocity requires a serious 
 
192 See, e.g., Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 (1984) 
(describing fair use as “an equitable rule of reason”); DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four [fair use] factors listed in [17 U.S.C.] Section 107 raise 
essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury.”). 
193 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2017) (providing for actual damages for copyright infringement in 
addition to disgorgement of infringer’s profits); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (providing that a copyright 
owner may elect to receive statutory damages rather than actual damages, to be awarded in an 
amount between $750 and $30,000 per work); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (providing that statutory 
damages may be increased up to the amount of $150,000 per work in the case of copyright 
infringement “committed willfully”). 
194 See 17 U.S.C. § 505.  
195 Cf. Meir Feder, Edwin Fountain & Geoffrey Stewart, What’s Wrong with the Copyright 
Regime, in William W. Fisher, Frank Cost, Shepard Fairey, Meir Feder, Edwin Fountain, 
Geoffrey Stewart & Marita Sturken, Reflections on the Hope Poster Case, 25 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 243, 298–305 (2012) (noting that jury trials can be particularly risky for copyright 
defendants asserting a fair use defense because of jury bias against people who copy the work of 
others).  
196 While this case is hypothetical, its general shape is taken from a copyright dispute in which 
the author represented an appropriation artist in settlement negotiations. Some elements of the 
hypothetical are also drawn from the “Hope Poster” case, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09-
01123, 2009 WL 319564, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011), in which, as a law student, the author 
served as a member of Shepard Fairey’s pro bono legal team. 
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engagement with the cultural contributions of minority actors and filmmakers, there was instead 
racial bias. In this case, the problem is not that Quinn is unwilling to entertain Morgan’s 
contribution to artistic culture. He does not like her T-shirt’s “punk aesthetic,” but his rejection 
of a licensing agreement does not result from racial or gender discrimination against Morgan. To 
see why this story about appropriation art also demonstrates a failure of semiotic justice, we need 
to consider the broader socio-legal context of the interaction between Quinn and Morgan.  
 Copyright law confers on creators an exclusive, property-like entitlement “to prepare 
derivative works based upon” the work in which they hold a copyright.197 In the case described 
above, Quinn exercises this right to regulate the conditions under which later entrants can 
contribute to the culture, restricting Morgan from making a T-shirt highlighting what she sees as 
the continuities between punk and Quinn’s photographic style. The failure of semiotic justice 
does not come from the one-off interaction between Morgan and Quinn, or even from the 
Copyright Act in isolation. Rather, the combination of many elements, including the breadth of 
copyright entitlements, the fact sensitivity of fair use determinations, the cost of hiring 
intellectual property lawyers and defending a lawsuit to the point of summary judgment, the 
absence of a strong welfare net providing insurance against the risk of a massive civil damages 
award, and the potential non-dischargability of copyright damages in bankruptcy,198 collectively 
confer a broad discretionary power on incumbent creators as a class to control which creative 
works that appropriate or riff on the incumbents’ works can legally be distributed to wide 
audiences. As a result, the formal rights of cultural participation are more useful to the class of 
 
197 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2017). 
198 See Star’s Edge, Inc. v. Braun (In re Braun), 327 B.R. 447, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005) 
(“Statutory damages for copyright infringement are also indicative of injury and, therefore, are 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.”); Feder, Fountain & Stewart, supra note 195, at 312. 
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incumbent creators, the group most likely to compose a non-democratic cultural elite, than to the 
class of new artistic creators, violating the guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties. 
 It might be objected to semiotic justice that any system of copyright law gives an 
entitlement to incumbent creators, and that semiotic justice reaches too far in claiming that fact 
patterns like the vignette about Morgan and Quinn provide evidence of an illegitimate 
constitution. However, the problem with American copyright law, from the standpoint of 
semiotic justice, is not just that it provides incumbent artists with the right to be compensated for 
uses of their works—the problem is the arbitrary control conferred on incumbent creators. The 
present system of copyright law fails to respect the capacity of new creators (relative to 
incumbent creators) to make contributions to culture. This failure of respect is clearest in cases in 
which conferring an entitlement on copyright holders does nothing to incentivize creative 
activity.199 
 Consider the following five reform strategies, which illustrate the range of legal 
reforms—some, but not all of which directly involve copyright law—that might be adopted in 
responses to cases like that of Morgan and Quinn to make the American constitutional order 
more legitimate. 
 
199 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act, which 
extended the duration of copyright from “creation until 70 years after the author’s death.” 537 
U.S. 186, 195–98 (2003). Congress extended the term in spite of the fact that “from a rational 
economic perspective the time difference among these periods makes no real difference.” Id. at 
255–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority did not disagree with Breyer’s assessment of 
economic rationality, but simply stated that it was deferring to Congress on the matter. Id. at 207 
n.15. At the same time, extending the copyright term by twenty years makes it significantly 
harder for authors to engage with and make use of works that would otherwise have fallen into 
the public domain. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 175 (2008). Such 
transfers of cultural power to incumbent actors that do not directly incentivize further creativity 
are likely to undermine the fair value of the cultural liberties. 
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 First, Congress could reform damages provisions of copyright law, eliminating statutory 
damages for copyright infringement involving appropriation art.200 At the same time, Congress 
could direct courts not to award attorneys’ fees to successful copyright plaintiffs in cases 
involving appropriation art and could encourage artists to assert fair use rights by establishing a 
presumption that courts will award costs and attorney’s fees to appropriation artists who 
successfully assert fair use as a defense.201 This reform strategy would not alter which exclusive 
rights accrue to copyright holders under the Copyright Act, or even to change what uses count as 
“fair use,” but would aim to make it less risky for non-incumbent creators to assert fair use rights 
and so to limit the degree to which incumbent creators can make use of the fact-sensitivity of fair 
use determinations to control appropriation art. 
 Second, Congress could institute compulsory licensing for appropriation art, modeled on 
existing compulsory licenses, such as compulsory licenses for making recordings of nondramatic 
musical compositions.202 Under such a program, artists like Quinn would retain an exclusive 
right to create derivative works but, when copyright owners were unwilling to bargain for a 
license or demanded unreasonably high licensing fees, creators of appropriation art like Morgan 
could obtain a license at a rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board, just as musicians can now 
obtain a compulsory license to create a “cover” of a song when a composer refuses to 
negotiate.203 In combination with this compulsory licensing scheme, Congress could institute a 
system of progressive taxation and wealth transfers to the poor to ensure that poor creators are 
 
200 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2017); see NETANEL, supra note 199, at 192–93. 
201 17 U.S.C. § 505; see Feder, Fountain & Stewart, supra note 195, at 311. 
202 17 U.S.C. § 115; see FISHER, supra note 13, at 252–58. 
203 See 17 U.S.C. § 115.; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING AND 
DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS (2018), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf; see also 
FISHER, supra note 13, at 41. 
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not financially excluded from the possibility of purchasing compulsory licenses.204 This strategy 
would leave incumbent creators with exclusive rights to produce derivative works but would 
limit their discretionary control to deny licenses. Artists like Quinn would receive compensation 
for appropriation art that made use of their copyrighted work but could not refuse to grant 
licenses on the grounds that they dislike the aesthetic qualities of an appropriative work. 
 Third, federal courts could amend their interpretations of fair use to more clearly and 
explicitly privilege appropriation art. While the statutory codification of fair-use doctrine lists 
four factors for courts to evaluate when determining whether a use is “fair,” this determination 
often boils down to the question of whether a use is “transformative.”205 Courts presently adopt a 
range of interpretations of transformativeness, but they could adopt a uniform interpretation 
according to which a work is transformative “if it either constitute[s] or facilitate[s] creative 
engagement with intellectual products.”206 This strategy, which would not require legislative 
action, would narrow the scope of the copyright entitlement enjoyed by incumbent creators by 
restricting copyright holders’ rights to control the preparation of derivative works, eliminating 
the need for appropriation artists to secure licenses to ensure that their work is non-infringing.207 
The class of incumbent creators would lose the ability to exercise the sort of control that Quinn 
seeks over Morgan’s work. 
 
204 See supra notes 178–181. 
205 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2017); see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
206 William W. Fisher III, How to Handle Appropriation Art, in Fisher et al., supra note 195, at 
323  (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fisher, supra note 4, at 1768); see also Rebecca 
Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L.J. 651, 654 (1997) (arguing that “fan fiction” should be uniformly protected as fair use 
“because it gives authors and readers meaning and enjoyment, allowing them to participate in the 
production of culture without hurting the legitimate interests of the copyright holder”). 
207 17 U.S.C. § 106 ; see Tushnet, supra note 196. 
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 Fourth, state legislatures and insurance commissions could make it easier to insure 
against awards of damages in copyright lawsuits, requiring, for instance, that liability insurance 
provided through homeowners’ and renters’ policies cover damages awards for copyright 
infringement when an infringing work is creative.208 At the same time, state bars could relax 
rules restricting who can practice law, increasing the supply of lawyers and thereby decreasing 
the cost of retaining counsel to defend against copyright infringement lawsuits.209 This set of 
reforms would not involve any changes to title 17 of the United States Code but would give a 
group of repeat players in the courts (i.e., insurance companies) a strong financial incentive to 
litigate fair use cases and advocate for clearer judicial statements of which uses are fair. It would 
also, like the first set of reforms, make it less risky for non-incumbent creators to assert fair use 
rights, limiting the ability of artists like Quinn to restrict the contributions of artists like Morgan 
to our shared culture. 
 Fifth, Congress could eliminate copyright and replace it with a system combining 
financial prizes for artists, authors, and musicians who make popular works of art with grants for 
artists, authors, and musicians administered by the National Endowment for the Arts and 
 
208 See Evaluating Homeowners and Renters Insurance Policies, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, 
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/evaluating-homeowners-and-renters-insurance-policies (last 
updated 2014) (surveying common homeowners insurance policies and concluding that 
“copyright [and] trademark infringement . . . do not appear to fall within most homeowners 
insurance policy definitions, and it is therefore unlikely that your homeowners insurance will 
cover you if you are sued for copyright or trademark infringement.”); cf. Myoda Comput. Ctr. v. 
Am. Family Mut., 909 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (enforcing a commercial insurance 
policy that expressly provided for coverage of injury arising out of “infringement of copyright, 
title, or slogan”); Christopher French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not 
Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 69 n.20 
(collecting cases where liability insurance policies for advertising injury provided coverage for 
copyright infringement).  
209 See WILLIAM D. HENDERSON, LEGAL MARKET LANDSCAPE REPORT: COMMISSIONED BY THE 
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 19–20, 27–28 (2018), 
http://board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000022382.pdf. 
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National Endowment for the Humanities.210 This more radical reform would eliminate the risk of 
incumbent creators controlling what later creations can enter culture by bringing all creative 
works into the public domain and incentivizing the creation of such goods through direct 
payments from the government rather than by granting limited-term monopolies. 
 The five reforms surveyed here illustrate the range of legal domains involved in 
respecting semiotic justice. 211 Any of a number of highly divergent, even orthogonal, reform 
strategies can bring the overall constitutional order more closely into conformity with the 
requirement to guarantee the fair value of the cultural liberties. 
In evaluating the different reform strategies that could address the failure of semiotic 
justice in cases of appropriation art, one must keep in mind the role that copyright law serves in a 
given legal order. If part of copyright law’s function is to make it easier for citizens who are not 
wealthy to make a living as creative artists by enabling them to monetize their artistic, musical, 
literary, and cinematic creations,212 restricting the rights accorded to copyright holders too 
severely might itself run afoul of semiotic justice. Because privileging creative copying as a fair 
 
210 See FISHER, supra note 13, at 200–03 (proposing an alternative compensation system to 
replace copyright protection for many cinematic and musical creations). 
211 Fully assessing reform strategies requires considering not only how copyright law intersects 
with other areas of law but also how copyright law intersects with material affordances and 
constraints on creativity. For instance, technologies that make it easier to create high quality 
sound recordings in a garage may change the relationship between copyright law and creativity. 
212 See Matthew Barblan, Copyright as a Platform for Artistic and Creative Freedom, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 793, 800 (2016). But see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Jiayang Sun & Yiying Fan, 
Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2009) (empirical study finding that greater protections for copyright 
do not lead creators to produce more work but rather “the historic growth in new copyrighted 
works is largely a function of population”); Ruth Towse, Copyright and Artists: A View from 
Cultural Economics, 20 J. ECON. SURVS. 567, 578 (2006) (surveying empirical studies and 
finding that “the main benefits of copyright are enjoyed by the ‘humdrum’ side of the cultural 
industries rather than the creators and . . . the distributions of royalties to artists other than the top 
few stars show how relatively little they get through the copyright system”). 
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use is unlikely to significantly affect the economic incentives to create new works,213 the first 
four strategies surveyed here— each of which would marginally reduce the profits available to 
copyright holders—could, individually or together, satisfy the requirements of semiotic justice. 
However, if restricting the ability of creators like Quinn to extract statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees for unauthorized creative uses of their art reduced incentives to create too 
substantially, semiotic justice might require that the system of copyright be replaced by or 
supplemented with an alternative compensation system of the sort entertained in the fifth reform 
strategy.214 
 Considering the application of semiotic justice to appropriation art helps show that 
semiotic justice entails different legal reforms than does Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of the 
equal political liberties. Rawls’s proviso might entail that all citizens must have a fair equal 
opportunity to create appropriative art that engages in social and political commentary,215 but 
semiotic justice suggests that all contributions to culture should enjoy this protection in order to 
 
213 See Tushnet, supra note 113, at 541. 
214 It might be objected to my application of semiotic justice to copyright that making it harder 
for artists to create appropriation art would actually encourage more artistic creativity, because 
artists who cannot rely on creative copying will instead come up with their own, more original 
creations. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 
(2015). This objection relies on an empirical claim about the nature of creativity and the 
relationship between appropriation art and originality which some prominent copyright scholars 
reject. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 4, at 1769 (arguing that privileging creative copying as fair 
use would “create more opportunities for Americans to become actively involved in shaping 
their culture”). Evaluating this empirical debate is beyond the scope of this Article. Setting aside 
the empirical question, democratic control of culture is not merely about how much total 
creativity is present in a culture. Democratic control of culture requires that every citizen have an 
equal opportunity to help shape the culture. Even if Fishman’s claim is correct—if some subset 
of citizens is most likely to contribute to the culture through appropriation art or fan fiction— 
respecting these members of the community as equal participants in the culture may require 
implementing one or more of the reform strategies discussed above. 
215 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 152 (1993) 
(suggesting that “art and literature that have the characteristics of social commentary” deserve 
heightened protection under the First Amendment). 
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ensure that all citizens can participate in the collective articulation and working-out of views 
about what the good life and a good culture consist in.  
C. Businesses’ Right to Refuse Service 
 The significance of semiotic justice comes into even clearer relief if one considers not an 
area of law explicitly concerned with culture and creativity, like copyright, but an area of private 
law that does not, on its face, aim to regulate cultural participation, such as property law. 
Consider the following cases concerning the power of business to choose their customers and 
control their premises: 
A. Neha, the sole proprietor of an art supply shop, refuses to sell high quality 
paints and canvases to Juan because she thinks that Juan’s art “exemplifies 
one of the most nihilistic styles in contemporary art.” 
 
B. Khanhvy, a grocer, refuses to sell cheese to George because George has a 
tattoo of a snake on his neck, which Khanhvy dislikes. 
 
C. The Green Hill Apartment Complex, Inc., refuses to allow the Green Hill 
Tenants’ Association to distribute its monthly newsletter (which is often 
critical of the Green Hill Apartment Complex’s management) by slipping the 
newsletter under tenants’ doors.216 
 
D. The East Valley Feminist Reading Group meets weekly at JavaStop Coffee 
Shop to discuss works of feminist theory. Some of their discussions involve 
explicit descriptions of sexual activity. The JavaStop manager tells the reading 
group that they are no longer welcome to meet at JavaStop because JavaStop 
management is “uncomfortable” with their discussions and tells them that if 
they return to JavaStop he will call the police. 
 
E. Cakemaster, LLC refuses to sell a wedding cake to Tina and Lisa because 
Cakemaster “doesn’t do same sex wedding cakes.”217 
 
 
216 This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway 
Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
217 This case is abstracted from the facts of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
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 The first four of these cases involve the typically absolute right of businesses (other than 
innkeepers and common carriers) to choose their customers, provided that they do not run afoul 
of civil rights statutes.218 In almost all jurisdictions in the United States, businesses can 
arbitrarily exclude members of the public, refusing to allow them to engage in speech on the 
premises of the business and refusing to sell them goods or services, provided that the exclusion 
is not based on one of several grounds specifically proscribed in a public accommodation statute 
(such as race, gender, age, sexual orientation, marital status, and employment by the military).219 
The fifth case represents a broader assertion of free speech rights by businesses, asserting a right 
to refuse service to customers even when that right comes into conflict with the requirements of 
civil rights statutes. 220 Even scholars who think that businesses should not be able to claim 
exceptions from generally applicable anti-discrimination laws often think that businesses should 
have a right to arbitrarily refuse service because conferring such a right of arbitrary refusal on 
business owners advances the value of autonomy and makes business owners less likely to be 
alienated from their work.221 
 However, these cases present prima facie evidence of a failure of semiotic justice. They 
do so not as isolated cases, but as instances of a broader pattern. Conferring a right of arbitrary 
exclusion on business owners grants owners of capital greater power than non-owners of capital 
to control the shape of our shared culture. Conferring a right on art shop proprietors to 
 
218 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 N.W. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1996). 
219 Id. at 1290–91. California provides a notable exception. See infra note 225. 
220 Such a right was asserted by the petitioner in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the plaintiff on narrow grounds without reaching the 
issue of whether the free speech rights of businesses can justify exemptions from generally 
applicable antidiscrimination laws. See id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
221 See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Commercial Complicity 41–42 (Feb. 18, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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marginally discourage artists whose style they do not like from making art, allowing small 
business owners to marginally discourage individuals from getting tattoos or wearing certain 
styles of clothes or encourage particular grooming habits, and enabling apartment building 
owners to regulate the sort of cultural communication that tenants engage in with one another in 
the hallways of apartment buildings all grant business owners as a class disproportionate power 
to control who can contribute to culture and how they can do so.222 This represents a failure of 
constitutional legitimacy in that the legal order confers on owners of capital the ability to 
transform the material resources that they control into cultural clout. When the legal system 
endorses the free speech rights of petit bourgeois small business owners to arbitrarily refuse 
service, it makes formal rights of free speech less valuable for the rest of us when we wish to 
influence the shape of our shared culture.223 
 The violation of semiotic justice represented by the five scenarios described above might 
be partially remedied by any of the following three reform strategies: 
 First, states could adopt expansive public accommodations statutes that deny businesses 
the right to arbitrarily refuse service.224 Among American jurisdictions, California stands out for 
its broad Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits all arbitrary discrimination by “all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever.”225 While the scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act’s 
 
222 A different case—and one that is less obvious, from the standpoint of semiotic justice—
would be presented if the businesses described here sought to exclude customers not because of 
the preferences of the owners of the business, but because the businesses were seeking to 
maximize profits and responded to the wishes of other customers. See supra Part II.A.3. 
223 See supra notes 104–110 and accompanying text. 
224 See Singer, supra note 218, at 1448 (arguing that a right of access should be extended to all 
places open to the public). 
225 Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (Deering 2019) (“All persons within the 
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual 
orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal 
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protections has been curtailed by courts in the past thirty years,226 California’s public 
accommodation law continues to prohibit the exclusion of individuals from businesses for 
arbitrary reasons.227 California courts could reinvigorate the statutory right of access to public 
businesses, barring businesses from refusing to sell to customers whose style, aesthetic 
sensibility, occupation, or politics they dislike,228 and state legislatures and municipal 
governments in other jurisdictions could adopt California’s broad statutory language 
guaranteeing individuals a right to be free from arbitrary discrimination by businesses. This 
reform would leave in place the economic inequalities that allow some people to own capital 
while others do not—which Rawls’s difference principle may permit229—but would interrupt the 
link between economic power and cultural influence that comes from an arbitrary right to 
 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of 
every kind whatsoever.”); see In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 995 (Cal. 1970) (holding that Unruh 
Civil Rights Act prohibits “all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise”); Marina Point, 
Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 120,122 (Cal. 1982) (noting that Unruh Civil Rights Act’s list of 
protected categories, such as sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, and national origin, is illustrative 
rather than restrictive). 
226 See Harris v. Capital Growth Inv’rs XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 880–83 (Cal. 1991) (narrowing the 
concept of arbitrary discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act “to discrimination based on 
personal characteristics similar to the statutory classifications of race, sex, religion, etc.” such as 
“a person's geographical origin, physical attributes, and personal beliefs” but not including 
“financial or economic status”); see also Sande L. Buhai, One Hundred Years of Equality: 
Saving California’s Statutory Ban on Arbitrary Discrimination by Businesses, 36 U. SAN 
FRANCISCO L. REV. 109, 126–30 (2001) (arguing that recent decisions of lower courts in 
California have limited the broad protections afforded by the Unruh Civil Rights Act). 
227 Cox, 474 P.2d at 994–95, 1001 (business may not exclude a customer because it dislikes the 
customer’s hair or unconventional clothing); see Harris, 805 P.2d at 879 (declining to overrule 
Cox); see Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d. 1022, 1029–32 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(noting that Cox remains good law in spite of its narrowing in Harris). 
228 See Buhai, supra note 226, at 110, 140–41 (“[C]ourts should find a way to construe the Unruh 
Act to protect the rights of all persons to participate in a society free from arbitrary 
discrimination.); see also id. at 140–41 (arguing that courts should interpret Harris as subjecting 
discrimination on the basis of “personal characteristics” to heightened scrutiny and requiring 
“legitimate business reasons” for any discrimination other than on the basis of personal 
characteristics). 
229 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 138–39. 
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exclude, reasserting democratic control over the grounds on which market relationships can be 
refused.  
 Second, state and federal courts could expansively interpret constitutional guarantees of 
free speech to restrict the judicial enforcement of private property rights. This strategy would 
pare down the bundle of rights held by property owners,230 restricting their ability to exclude 
individuals from speaking and being present in places open to the public.231 Some state 
constitutions contain free speech provisions that encompass restrictions on free speech by private 
parties, as well as the state.232 While state courts have often interpreted such rights of free speech 
against private parties narrowly,233 they could limit the ability of capital owners to exercise 
 
230 For a discussion of the bundle theory of property rights, see, for example, Shane Nicholas 
Glackin, Back to Bundles: Deflating Property Rights, Again, 20 LEGAL THEORY 1, 2 (2014) 
(defending a deflationary theory of property as a bundle of rights); Hugh Breakey, Property, 
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://www.iep.utm.edu/prop-con/ (last visited Sept. 
13, 2018) (describing the bundle theory of property rights). 
231 See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (finding that privately owned 
shopping center was entitled to exclude pamphleteers from its premises). 
232 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.”); Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979) (applying the California Constitution’s free speech 
provision to a privately-owned shopping center), aff’d 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see Golden Gateway 
Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n., 29 P.3d 797, 826 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he original state free speech clause, as originally enacted and as it appears today . . . grants a 
right of free speech running against private parties as well as state actors”). In 2001, a plurality 
of the California Supreme Court sought to impose a state action requirement on the California 
Constitution’s free speech clause. Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at 810–11. However, a majority 
of the court has never adopted a state action requirement. Subsequent opinions have applied the 
California Constitution’s free speech right to privately owned retail establishments without 
raising the question of state action. See Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 
172 P.3d 742, 743 (Cal. 2007) (holding the California Constitution’s free speech rights includes 
the right to urge customers to boycott a store located in a privately-owned mall).  
233 See Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at 810 (a tenants’ association has no right under article I, 
section 2 of the California Constitution to distribute its newsletter by slipping it under tenants’ 
doors in a large apartment complex); Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 8, 290 P.3d 1116, 1120 (Cal. 2012) (restricting the free speech right 
recognized by Pruneyard to the common areas of large shopping centers where shoppers are 
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control over the shared space of culture by adopting more expansive interpretations, holding, for 
instance, that the same free speech rights that restrict the ability of publicly owned commercial 
entities to exclude individuals also restrict the judicial enforcement of private property rights by 
all businesses open to the public.234 Courts in jurisdictions that lack constitutional free speech 
guarantees that directly apply to private parties could achieve the same outcome by expanding 
Shelley v. Kraemer’s conclusion that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants 
constitutes state action to encompass all judicial enforcement of rights in real property. 235 This 
reform strategy would leave in place the economic inequalities that gave rise to the violation of 
semiotic justice in the five cases described above but would seek to take democratic control of 
the grounds on which police and courts can be asked to enforce prohibitions on trespassing.  
 Third, state or federal governments could expropriate some or all capital from private 
individuals and corporations, adopting an economic system of liberal socialism.236 This strategy 
would require a radical rethinking of constitutional restrictions on takings, specifically, and, 
 
invited “to stop and linger and to leisurely congregate for purposes of relaxation and 
conversation”). 
234 See ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
publicly-owned pedestrian mall constitutes a public forum for First Amendment purposes); see 
also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 719, 723–24 (1961) (holding that Equal 
Protection Clause applies to a private business leasing public property); Mark Cordes, Property 
and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1997); cf. Balkin, supra note 4, at 3 
(“Freedom of speech is rapidly becoming the key site for struggles over the legal and 
constitutional protection of capital in the information age.”). 
235 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). In the federal courts, adopting this strategy would 
require overruling Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, which held that protesters were not entitled to exercise 
free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment on the property of a privately owned 
shopping center, 407 U.S. 551, 562–63 (1972), and a return to the constitutional jurisprudence of 
Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), and Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
236 See DAVID SCHWEICKART, AGAINST CAPITALISM 282–92 (1993); see also RAWLS, supra note 
4, at 138 (describing liberal socialism and property owning democracy as the two types of 
economic system that might satisfy the requirements of justice as fairness). 
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more generally, of the state’s role in the market.237 Unlike the first two strategies, this strategy of 
state socialism could leave free speech and public accommodation law unchanged. By limiting 
the capacity of individuals and classes to amass economic control of institutions that provide 
opportunities for citizens to contest shared conceptions of the good, restricting private ownership 
of capital would interrupt the entrenchment of economic and cultural power that threatens to rob 
the cultural liberties of their fair value.238 To satisfy semiotic justice, such public control of 
capital would need to be connected to effectively functioning political systems of democratic 
control in order to prevent political elites from simply taking over control from economic 
elites.239 If, as some cultural theorists argue, a psychological tendency to defer to owners is so 
bound up with the history of private property that such deference is inextricable from the idea of 
 
237 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). Such a rethinking might involve a radical expansion of the public trust 
doctrine, treating capital as a public resource held in trust by the government for the people, such 
that any legal framework that the state adopts allocating capital to private individuals may 
subsequently be rescinded. Cf. Ill. Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (holding 
the state of Illinois lacked authority to transfer title to lands under Lake Michigan held in public 
trust as navigable waters); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 
47, 53–54 (N.J. 1972) (holding modern changes in use of tidelands justify expanding the 
historical public trust doctrine). 
238 This is not to suggest that minority cultures cannot develop in an illegitimate political order. 
See Stuart Hall, Notes on Deconstructing “the Popular,” in CULTURAL THEORY AND POPULAR 
CULTURE: A READER 442, 446–48 (John Storey ed., 2d ed., 1998). What is compromised is not 
the possibility of countercultures but the realization of equality. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to 
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 
323, 335 (1987). 
239 See David Beetham, Beyond Liberal Democracy, 18 SOCIALIST REG. 190, 203–05 (1981); see 
also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787 (1987) (“[T]he state might act 
wrongfully, and thereby restrict or impoverish rather than enhance public debate . . . but . . . this 
same danger is presented by all social institutions, private or public, and that there is no reason 
for presuming that the state will be more likely to exercise its power to distort public debate than 
would any other institution.”). 
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property,240 this strategy of liberal socialism might provide the only reform agenda that can fully 
satisfy the demands of semiotic justice. 
 The wide range of possible reform strategies—from expanding anti-discrimination laws, 
to narrowing the scope of private rights conferred by property ownership, to adopting a socialist 
organization of the economy—illustrates the range of options open to a community that wishes 
to make its constitution legitimate. As in the cases of #OscarsSoWhite and appropriation art, 
evaluating these reform strategies requires considering the relationship between the formal equal 
basic liberties and the fair value of the cultural liberties. Restrictions on political campaign 
expenditures constitute, in some respect, a restriction on formal liberty of speech but preserve the 
value of the right to engage in political speech for all citizens.241 Similarly, the first and second 
reforms discussed here restrict the formal speech rights and associational rights of business 
owners in order to promote the fair value of the right to participate in cultural expression. The 
third reform strategy is the most economically radical of the three, but it provides a mechanism 
by which a state could enhance the fair value of the cultural liberties without curtailing formal 
free speech rights. Fully assessing these reforms would require evaluating the ways in which the 
different formal and substantive liberties promote the exercise of the two moral powers.242 
 It may be objected to semiotic justice that the logic that motivates the first two reform 
proposals discussed here threatens to undermine the state action doctrine of American 
constitutional law,243 for it is not just business owners who turn economic resources into cultural 
 
240 See generally David Graeber, Manners, Deference, and Private Property in Early Modern 
Europe, 39 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 694 (1997). 
241 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 361. 
242 See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 149–50. 
243 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923 (1982). See generally Terri Peretti, 
Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 273 (2010) 
(providing a historical survey of the state action doctrine in U.S. courts). 
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clout. What about owners of large houses who regularly host literary salons, inviting friends and 
influential authors to gather for dinner? Does conferring the right on homeowners to exclude 
unwanted guests impermissibly grant a cultural power to a particular class (homeowners) that 
other citizens are denied?244 I agree that the case of the salon host has the same structure as the 
case of the businesses arbitrarily excluding customers. If a state’s constitutional order lets some 
citizens control much larger residences than others, and if citizens can convert such residential 
resources into cultural capital, the guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties may be 
violated. This is not to suggest that the remedy is for the police to refuse to help homeowners 
keep unwanted guests out of dinner parties. Assessing what to do requires balancing the formal 
rights guaranteed by the first principle of justice together with the fair value of the political and 
cultural liberties. If ensuring access to the scheme of equal basic liberties to all citizens requires 
conferring the right to exclude unwanted guests from dinner parties on bigoted private 
individuals, then other features of the constitutional order may need to give way.245 For instance, 
inequalities in wealth that enable some individuals to control much larger residential spaces that 
others may be impermissible under semiotic justice. This example illustrates the significance of 
elevating the fair value of the cultural liberties to the level of the constitutional essentials. The 
question of whether homeowners can exclude unwanted guests is not settled by lexical priority of 
 
244 See LAURENCE TRIBE, 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1691 (2d ed. 1988) (“[E]xempting 
private action from the reach of the Constitution’s prohibitions . . . stops the Constitution short of 
preempting individual liberty—of denying to individuals the freedom to make certain choices 
. . . . Such freedom is basic under any conception of liberty, but it would be lost if individuals 
had to conform their conduct to the Constitution’s demands.”); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. 
Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 503–04 (1962). 
245 See Mattias Kumm, Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as 
Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341, 362–63 (2006) 
(arguing that “the application of constitutional rights to the private context does not undermine 
an important point of rights, which is to provide individuals with a private sphere within which 
they need not be concerned with being held publicly accountable”). 
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the formal liberty of freedom of association above the fair equality of opportunity; rather, we 
must balance competing constitutional rights to determine whether homeowners may 
legitimately claim such a power.246  
 The problem of businesses’ abilities to arbitrarily exclude highlights the divergence of 
semiotic justice from Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of the political liberties. While Rawls’s 
proviso might require the expansion of rights to engage in political protests and to petition on 
private property, guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural liberties requires denying owners of 
capital the power to control who contributes to our shared culture. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 This article has argued that liberal theorists should endorse a constitutional guarantee of 
the fair value of the political liberties given their existing commitments to ensuring that 
individuals can develop and pursue their own conceptions of the good life. The cases described 
in Part III represent failures of the fair value of the cultural liberties. They also represent failures 
of citizens to reciprocally share the burdens and benefits of living together in a community. In 
the #OscarsSoWhite case, minority actors are treated as less than full contributors to elite 
cinematic culture. In the appropriation art case, new entrants to the art scene are treated as less 
entitled to mold the culture than are incumbent artists. In the cases of businesses refusing 
services and excluding speakers, members of the bourgeoisie are granted the entitlement to use 
material resources that other economic classes lack to impose their idea of what our shared 
culture should look like. Remedying this failure of reciprocity is necessary if we wish to build a 
legitimate constitutional order.  
 
246 In this respect, incorporating fair value guarantees into the first principle of justice limits the 
legal significance of the state action doctrine and pushes toward the full constitutionalization of 
private law. See id. at 368–69. 
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 The discussion of the reforms that might help to bring about semiotic justice suggests that 
guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural liberties often requires the same sorts of reforms 
required by Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties but also often 
requires more. Depending on how we choose to resolve the conflict between formal liberties of 
free speech and association and the fair value of the cultural liberties, semiotic justice may 
require radical political and legal reforms, ranging from judicial modifications of copyright and 
property law to legislative revamping of our political and economic order. Because this article is 
concerned with articulating the normative reform agenda of semiotic justice, a consideration of 
the political likelihood and workability of the reforms suggested here is beyond the present 
scope.  
However, this exploration of the reforms necessary to guarantee the fair value of the 
cultural liberties suggests that it may be much more difficult to achieve a legitimate constitution 
than we might previously have thought. Creating a constitutional order that embodies reciprocal 
respect among all citizens requires that we quarantine those economic and social inequalities 
authorized by the constitution to prevent them from undermining the democratic control of both 
culture and politics, a task that may seem impossible or nearly so in our present political 
moment. Building a legitimate constitution requires that we all come to see one another as “co-
worker[s] in the kingdom of culture” and that our laws and institutions embody this respect.247 
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